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Abstract of Thesis 
University of Central Oklahoma 
Edmond, Ok 
Name: Marcus Kent 
Title of Thesis: Political Economic Racism: California‘s Policy Regarding its Asian 
Immigrants, 1848-1943 
Director of Thesis: Xiao-bing Li 
Abstract: From 1848 – 1943, California enacted a policy known as political economic 
racism: the act of discriminating against a particular ethnic group economically through 
the political process. The target of their legislation was Asian immigrants, specifically the 
Chinese and the Japanese. As the Chinese arrived with countless others as part of the 
Gold Rush, they quickly faced discrimination, and legislative acts against them. During 
the 1850s, California enacted several laws designed specifically toward the Chinese. One 
such law, the Foreigner Miners Tax, generated significant revenue for the state. The 
Chinese were paying their portion of taxes to a government that provided services to a 
people that did not like Chinese. Labor groups ultimately formed, pushed for, and 
received in 1882 an Exclusion Act preventing Chinese laborers from entering into the 
U.S. 
 The Japanese started to arrive two years after Chinese Exclusion. They faced a 
similar treatment from Californians as they worked well in agriculture. Labor groups 
fought for alien land laws preventing the Japanese from owning land in the state. Several 
other states, including the District of Columbia, had an alien land law similar to that of 
proposed Californian law. The state believed their law was in line with existing U.S. 
treaties with Japan. The law passed in 1913, but the state followed with more 
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amendments in 1920, 1923, and in 1927. Each law made it more difficult for the Japanese 
to own, lease, or work on farms in California.  
California was not the only state to development political economic racism. 
Washington, Montana, and Wyoming, also followed in California‘s footsteps and enacted 
the policy as well. The incidents that occurred in these states are reflection of the anti-
Asian attitudes that California helped perpetuate. The following will show how California 
developed the policy of political economic racism and its effects on the state and on areas 















In late April 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed into law a new 
immigration bill designed to restrict the movement of illegal immigrants in the state. The 
governor claimed she addressed an issue that the federal government continued to avoid. 
The law, however, was too vague. Although on the surface the public is well aware the 
bill‘s purpose is to intimidate and scare illegal Mexicans into leaving and to pressure the 
federal government into action, nowhere in the law does it define what exactly constitutes 
an illegal immigrant. Does the white British student who overstayed his or her visa fit this 
definition? Arizona‘s candor in addressing its illegal immigration issue is similar to that 
of California‘s Chinese and Japanese questions from 1848 – 1943. Multiple governors 
across the American West confronted the issues associated with the massive influx of 
Asian immigrants. California, however, developed a specific policy in dealing with the 
matter. The state spearheaded the movement in creating an environment known as 
―Yellow Peril.‖ A combination of race, economics, and politics resulted in various 
legislation at the state level designed to drive the Chinese or Japanese away from 
California. However, as more and more Asians immigrated to the area despite their 
attempts, the western states, led by California and labor groups, pushed for and received 
exclusion laws for the Chinese and eventually the Japanese. James Goldsborough in 
―California‘s Foreign Policy‖ (1993) summed up a common fear, ―Californians have 
always believed that their worse problems came from abroad.‖
1
 The purpose of this thesis 
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is show how primarily California, along with states west of the Mississippi River, 
instituted and implemented a policy of political-economic racism: the act of economically 
discriminating against a particular ethnic group through the political process. The 
Chinese and the Japanese became the sole targets of legislation designed to impact them 
economically. Various labor groups campaign for laws specifically tailored for these 
groups because they became very successful where white people had previously failed. 
Although other states west of the Mississippi River demonstrated similar positions 
to that of California, they did not have the economic nor political influence California 
possessed. The Golden State accessed the Asian markets, a growing source of trade for 
the U.S. The second chapter details the history of Chinese immigration into the nation as 
part of the gold rush. From there, the story continues with the railroad, factories, all the 
way to the Exclusion Act in 1882. Despite the attempts of the Six Companies and the 
clergy, who defended Chinese immigration in the state, This chapter serves as the 
blueprint for what is to come for the Japanese, who would arrive in California just two 
years after the Exclusion Act passed. Chapter three continues the story of the Chinese 
immigrants from after the Exclusion Act passed to its repeal in 1943. Despite the pressure 
from California and labor unions across the country in getting Chinese excluded from 
entering the country, labor issues with the Chinese continued. Companies across the U. S. 
routinely sought out Chinese labor for work and even smuggled them into the country for 
projects. This section will show that despite the working man's desire to not see any more 
Chinamen, corporations in the country contained a different viewpoint.  
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Chapters four and five focus and directs attention toward the Japanese 
immigrants, who started to arrive in 1884. As the Exclusion Act took effect, Chinese 
numbers diminished and Californian companies wanted cheap labor. The timing worked 
out in the corporations favor as the Japanese rushed into the state. But as the Japanese 
worked for low wages, they started to save and purchase farm land. Soon, Japanese 
owners hired Japanese tenants, starting a revolution that led to white California believing 
their state was again under a ―Yellow Peril.‖ In the early part of the twentieth century, 
labor groups pushed for and received, multiple alien land laws aimed at preventing 
Japanese ownership of the land in California. Although other states possessed similar 
laws to California, the Japanese government only focused its attention on preventing 
passage of the law in that particular state due to overwhelming presence of its citizens 
residing there. Despite political and economic pressure, a series of alien land laws passed 
that helped led to the decline of Japanese land ownership. 
The rise and fall of both Chinese and Japanese labor in California are both linked 
to economics, political disposition of the state, and racist laws towards these particular 
groups. Although other immigrant groups faced various forms of discrimination, they are 
pale in comparison to the degree in which Asian immigrations became persecuted for 
making a living. The following is the account of Chinese and Japanese immigration in 
California from 1848 through 1943. It focuses on their arrival, impact on the state and 






Chapter One: The Development of Political Economic Racism 
 One cannot investigate the anti-Chinese movement in California without 
examining Ping Chiu's Chinese Labor in California: An Economic Study. Chui, a 
professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, dived into the matter, looking at it 
with an economic angle. The purpose of the work ―is an attempt to describe and analyze 
the role of Chinese immigrants within the framework of the general economic 
development of California.‖
2
 Looking at a variety of primary sources such as state and 
federal documents, newspapers, and other premiere scholars, Chui created a manuscript 
that stands apart from his peers. While most historians who look at the anti-Chinese from 
more of a political perspective, Chinese Labor focuses entirely on the economics, giving 
a more complete and accurate historical account of the past.
3
 
 The book does an excellent job of narrating the Chinese involvement in the 
economy over the decades. It chronicles the movement from the gold rush to the railroad 
to the factories. One of the sources used in Chinese Labor was J. D. Borthwick's Three 
Years in California (1935). Borthwick noted the Chinese carried a ―feminine way of 
handling tools.‖
4
 Also of mention was the evidence of their inexperience in mining 
matters. The Chinese possessed amateur skills at best yet found a way of completing 
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large tasks together. One of the newspapers used in Three Years in California was the 
Alta California. This publication documents the daily events in California, including 
events on the railroad. At one particular juncture in construction, the Chinese workers 
went on strike. This, however, did not last long. Within a week, the crew went back to 
work.
5
 Chiu used Census information as a base to help determine when the Chinese 
entered the agriculture sector of the economy. Because information is so limited, few 
Chinese are believed to have worked in that industry till the 1870s.
6
 
In Martin Brown and Peter Philips‘s Competition, Racism, and Hiring Practices 
among California Manufacturers, 1860-1882 (1986), the authors acknowledge the 
balance between racism and market structure. Brown and Philip‘s, like Chiu, look at a 
variety of primary documents, such as economic reports and newspapers, they examine 
―the extent to which racism pressures forced the substitution of white women for in-place 
male Chinese workers in four California manufacturing industries.‖
7
As Chinese workers 
became shut out of gold mining they turned to manufacturing in order to earn a living 
taking over traditional women‘s jobs. The industries that Brown and Philips researched 
began hiring Chinese immigrants during the 1860s when women began to enter the state 
in numbers. The Woolen Mills, Canneries, Boots & Shoes, and Cigar industries all 
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slowly became dependent on their labor. In testimony on Capitol Hill, a woolen mill 
operator mentioned finding and training women for job became difficult. Male white 
labor dried off in the 1860s and grew to be expensive due to the boom the state 
experienced. The owners in those industries experimented with Chinese labor and the 
rewards paid off as it developed into a cheaper way to do business. As a result, women 
found themselves slowly moved out of the job market.
8
 The owner of a jute factory told 
Congress that his crew consistently ―almost entirely Chinese, except the foreman, we 
tried to get Scotch help, white girls. We imported them for that very purpose, but could 
not keep them a fortnight. They ran away.‖
9
  
 In Alexander Saxton's The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese 
Movement in California, (1971) uses a plethora of primary documents. Among them are 
state and federal documents and newspapers. Saxton relies on Hubert Howe Bancroft's 
History of California and Ira B. Cross's A History of the Labor Movement in California. 
The author states ―the purpose of this study is to examine the Chinese confrontation on 
the Pacific Coast, as it was experienced and rationalized by the white majority.‖
10
 Like 
Chiu, Saxton too uses the Alta California and Census reports as a part of his primary 
documents. Indispensable Enemy uses the San Francisco Examiner heavily when 
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discussing the Denis Kearney's Workingman's Party. In the summer of 1877, the WPC 
staged a variety of events. One event in particular started the night of July 23. Near San 
Francisco's city hall, a crowd gathered near a sandlot. Throughout the course of the day 
several speakers made speeches regarding working conditions. As the day turned into 
night, a walking band of hoodlums aggravated a portion of the crowd. The irritated group 
went out into the city and started fires and vandalized twenty to thirty Chinese homes. 
The Examiner, a pro-union publication, speculated as to who the criminals could be.
11
 
Saxton differed from Chiu as he focused on the political aspects of events. Although 
Saxton address the economics and its importance to the unfolding events, he does not go 
into the depth in which Chiu does. 
 Saxton draws on Ira Cross's research as he discusses the number of labor unions 
active in San Francisco from 1882 - 1883. Most trade unions represented a craft usually 
in one of three big industries: building trades, maritime, and metal trades.
12
 The unions 
lacked effective leadership in the late 1870s into the early 1880s. Saxton and Cross both 
cite labor union leader Frank Roney and his autobiographical work Frank Roney, Irish 
Revel and California Labor Leader as the main source of information during the time 
regarding labor union activities. While Roney briefly left California to Nevada and 
became a socialist, he shortly returned to California.  
 In the buildup towards the exclusion act other newspapers besides the Examiner 
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hyped up the anti-Chinese rhetoric. The San Francisco Truth published stories about 
Chinese involvement in labor. Also the Trades Assembly ―prepared a statistical survey of 
Chinese penetration.‖
13
 In the report findings they exposed the industries that the Chinese 
affected the most, particularly ―the cigarmakers, tailors, boot and shoemakers, makers of 
male and female underclothes, brush and broom making and the manufacture of 
slippers.‖
14
 Indispensable Enemy uses these sources to show how widespread the anti-
Chinese attitude was at the time.  
 As the Chinese question died down as a result of the Exclusion Act in 1882, in 
the early part of the twentieth century an event took place in California that made 
President Theodore Roosevelt upset at an entire state and led to whispers of war on both 
sides of the Pacific Ocean. The incident occurred in San Francisco in 1906 as the local 
school board voted unanimously to remove their Japanese students and segregate them 
from the white students. In a review of, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American 
crises: An account of the International Complications Arising from the Race Problem on 
the Pacific Coast (1962), Thomas Bailey wrote extensively on the San Francisco School 
Board decision segregate Japanese students from their schools and the aftermath of their 
decision, not just for Californians, but for the United States . 
Bailey was an assistant professor at Stanford University and wrote numerous 
articles and books on Japanese immigrants in California. Using a wide-array of primary 
documents such as letters from key politicians, newspaper, and secondary sources from 
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other scholars in the field, Bailey broke down a complex issue into an enjoyable read. 
Although the casual reader will not find some of the material as interesting as historians 
or anyone looking to do a project on discrimination, students in the field of political 
science or history readily can use this book as a reference to an event that often goes un-
noticed. He discredits those who believe the anti-Japanese movement was primarily a city 
phenomenon. By showing the support of the anti-Asian groups during this time, he 
conveys the statewide discrimination against the Japanese. 
Bailey‘s ―purpose of the present volume is to examine critically the causes, 
course, and results of these developments in Japanese-American relations.‖
15
 Throughout 
the book, he often quoted Roosevelt and his frustration with not only the politicians in 
California but also the people themselves. The author showed the depth of the problem in 
the eyes of the president and how something the school board thought affected only them 
was in fact a major international crisis. In memos to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who 
later became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the president writes 
―it gives me a feeling of disgust to see them challenge Japanese hostility and justify by 
their actions any feeling the Japanese might have against us.‖
16
 The author‘s application 
of such letters effectively displays the concern Roosevelt conveyed during the crisis. 
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Bailey uses a variety of newspapers during the time to help prove his premise. He 
frequently supplies the San Francisco papers active during the time such as Chronicle, 
Argonaut, and the Bulletin. The newspapers provided Bailey with a great source of 
information as some of the information printed in the newspapers, through fact checking, 
over exaggerate the Japanese and create perceptions that do not exist for the people of 
California during the time. The author also looked at foreign newspapers such as the 
Japan Weekly Mail to get an outsiders perspective on the events unfolding in California. 
Bailey well rounds the points of view to give the reader the big picture yet while still 
focused on the incident in San Francisco. 
The author again used Roosevelt‘s own words in putting an end to the crisis and 
easing the Japanese concerns, at least until the alien law appeared six years later. 
Roosevelt believed that presidents needed to lead during the extreme events and that 
required the cabinet to follow suit. Because of that philosophy, the commander-in-chief 
ordered a fleet to sail into the Pacific Ocean. Although the administration began 
scheduling the expedition two years earlier, Roosevelt wanted to convey a message of 
strength and understanding.  The author exercised the notes from a correspondent of the 
London Times as well as the Lodge Letters to effectively show this. 
The racism illustrated by Californians during this period often referred to as ―race 
prejudice.‖ Californians fear and discrimination of not just the Japanese, but also their 
Chinese residents as well, is similar to that of the southern states view toward blacks. 
During the incident, the author shows how the southern politicians agreed with the school 
board‘s decision and supported them openly on the floor of the Congress. The racism, 
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whether in the form of boycotts, acts of violence, or segregation, did not end in 1906. It 
continued in California and their actions affected the nation. Bailey wrote how Roosevelt 
predicted the Californians continued resentment of its Japanese subjects made war seem 
inevitable between the U. S. and Japan. Overall, Bailey proves his thesis by showing case 
casing the short and long term implications of the San Francisco school board‘s decision 
to segregate their Japanese students from the rest of the general public. The detail the 
author goes into in the work is extensive, well written, and shows the state of affairs in 
California in a neutral aspect that the reader can enjoy.  
Theodore Roosevelt was not the only president plagued by the state of California. 
Roger Daniels, author of Politics of Prejudice (1962), wrote how the Wilson 
administration became bogged down in their state of affairs in 1913, seemingly out of 
nowhere, just like Roosevelt.  The Californian government sent word to Wilson they 
planned on passing an alien land law, with the intent of prohibiting the Japanese from 
owning land. The Japanese, along with European interest, protested the legislation 
coming from California. Wilson became two-faced on the alien land law issue out west 
and eventually did not fight to challenge it.     
 Daniels outlined in great detail the immigration and cultural presence of the 
Japanese in California. He documents the birth of Japanese emigration in 1884, the few 
numbers they first explored the New World, all the way to the eventual Exclusion Act in 
1924. The book provides a viewpoint that characterized the race relations in California 
between its Asian and white communities as an intense struggle for the future of the state. 
The Japanese numbers continued to grow, their presence ever more widespread, and a 
sense to be more than just farm helpers went into effect.  The Japanese immigrant 
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population grew to 2.1% in 1920, they accumulated wealth more quickly and worked 
more efficiently over their white counterparts. The measure of how much that affected 
society on an economic level brings questions.  
Daniels addressed the economic impact the Japanese produced and how it 
translated into political action in the state. Looking primarily at Masao Suzuki, who was 
an economics professor at Mills College, the author looks at the different occupations, the 
wages associated with it, and the general overall wealth of the Japanese community 
during that time. Daniels discussed a wealth of primary documents throughout the book, 
detailing the arrival and the impact the Japanese community had while in California. He 
looks at immigration reports from the state of California, census information, as well as 
labor reports to accurately portray the farming issue. The Japanese amassed land more 
rapidly than their white counter parts and in some communities provided the majority of a 
particular crop such as tomatoes, particularly in the Sacramento area. The anger and 
frustration began to boil over as white farmers and labors demanded action to combat 
what they saw as a growing menace. Newspapers often over exaggerated Japanese 
success stories to showcase an impending doom that will engulf their state if something is 
not done soon. They tried boycotts, even violence, but the Japanese pumped more 
emigrants to the U. S.  
The term ―race prejudice‖ is used throughout the work to describe the emotion 
characterized by the laboring class over the perceived Yellow Peril that existed not just in 
California but in other western states as well. With the Japanese population growing and 
no end in sight, the author writes how the only grievance Californians sought became the 
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legislative process. The working class previously ―defeated‖ the perceived Chinese 
menace in 1882 with an Exclusion Act. They believed the state needed to start the 
process against the Japanese in order to combat the growing challenges they faced. 
Beginning in 1911, they began to look into alien land law legislation. Other states passed 
similar measures to either limit or prevent immigrants from owning land and they saw it 
as an opportunity to accomplish a similar goal. Daniels effectively showed that, although 
in 1911 the labor groups failed to gain traction for their cause, it laid the ground work for 
what became the Alien Land Law of 1913. The phrase ―ineligible to citizenship‖ became 
a hot button issue throughout the nation. The Japanese became ruled not eligible for 
citizenship in 1892. Wilson requested that the phrase dropped from the final version of 
the bill to appease Japanese complaints. The Japanese fought to prevent the alien land 
law from passing the California state legislature. Led by Viscount Chinda, the Japanese 
Ambassador, the author explains how the Japanese ambassador met with Wilson and 
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in an attempt to stop the bill. The Japanese, 
however, confronted many obstacles and grew desperate. With seemingly no true effort 
from the Wilson Administration, other than a token gesture of sending Bryan to 
California to talk to California state leaders, the Japanese raced reality: the racism in 
California grew rampant and manifested itself into legislation.  
With Daniels‘s research and writing style, the book is excellent for historians, 
politicians, or anyone looking to learn about a piece of legislation that is often left out of 
the history books. The author broke down the various sides on the argument, why the 
alien land laws affected so many different groups of people, and the how the laws 
impacted not just the immigrants, but citizens all across the state. Although Roosevelt 
20 
 
and Wilson both faced similar adversity in dealing with a Japanese situation in California, 
the perceived Yellow Peril, and the racism that followed, eventually led to a black eye for 
the U. S. 
Just as the state shifted from the Chinese to the Japanese, the land of California 
transformed greatly for generations from the mid nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. From the time of the Gold Rush or Silicon Valley, the area consistently built 
upon the previous decade.
17
 With the help of the railroad, the nation expanded bringing 
immigrants from all over the world, particularly from Asia. In Richard Walker‘s 
California’s Golden Road to Riches: Natural Resources and Regional Capitalism, 1848-
1940 (2001), he disagrees with those who described the region as resource rich and 
neglected to realize the importance of other economic sectors.
18
 The technology and 
manufacturing sectors of the economy supported an ever growing agriculture economy, 




As the region out west became more diverse from the influx of the different 
immigrants, so did the faces on the farm land. In Robert Higgs‘s Landless by Law: 
Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture to 1941 (1978), he studies the success of 
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the Japanese in the 2
nd
 half the twentieth century by examining their role in California‘s 
agriculture system. From 1890 to 1920, Japanese immigration went up rapidly and by the 
summer of 1909, 30,000 Japanese worked on farms.
20
 Higgs addresses the impact of one 
particular group on society and agreeing with fellow scholars such as Roger Daniels, 
author of Politics of Prejudice (1962). Daniels outlined in great detail the immigration 
and cultural presence of the Japanese in California. The book provided a viewpoint that 
characterized the race relations in California between its Asian and white communities as 
an intense struggle for the future of the state.  
 The economic impact the Japanese immigrants effected on society is debatable. 
The Japanese immigrant population grew to 2.1% in 1920, the Japanese immigrants 
clearly accumulated wealth more quickly and worked more efficiently over their white 
counterparts. The measure of how much that affected society on an economic level brings 
questions. Masao Suzuki, a professor of economics, agreed with some of his colleagues 
that the Japanese immigrants played an important part the everyday life of California but 
argued that their overall impact is inflated. In his Success Story? Japanese Immigrant 
Economic Achievement and Return Migration, 1920-1930 (1995), he analyzes Landless 
by Law but focuses his research on the returning Asian immigrant looking at Higgs, 
Daniels, and Thomas Sowell among others.  He describes how initially the alien land 
laws had some effect, but as the laws prevented Japanese mobility economically, the 
immigrants moved back. More immigrants returned to Japan then the country emigrated. 
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The passage of the 1913 and 1920 alien land law bills impacted the Japanese farmers as 
the total number of acres owned by them dropped by 34% by 1930.
21
 
 Miller, Daniels, and Saxton, among others, mainly address the political discourse 
of events by result of the economic pressures being assaulted against politicians during 
the respective time. Most historians follow suit in Miller and Daniels's research and focus 
the bulk of their attention on political rather than the economic in a way that Chiu or 
Brown and Philip‘s have. Later historians have attempted fill in the gap on the Chinese 
labor issue, focusing on the years after the Exclusion Act became and law, and before its 
repeal. Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen's The Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco 
and the Smuggling of Chinese Immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1882-1930 
(2006), is one of many that illustrates that although most Chinese were forbidden to enter 
the U.S., companies still demanded Chinese labor to work on their projects.  
The term political economic racism comes out of a result of years of research into 
the Chinese and Japanese labor movement in California. In Isabella Black's article 
Labour and Chinese Immigration (1963), she describes how three things led to legislation 
being passed against Asian immigrants; those items were race, politics, and economics. 
In many respects, the items fed off each other. The Asian immigrants were easy to point 
out and many did not try to assimilate into American culture. More and more Asians 
would arrive, becoming prosperous, setting into motion political action as a way to stem 
the tide in favor of the white man.  
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While the term political economic racism may be new, it is not without precedent. 
African-Americans in the South faced extreme prejudice after the Civil War ended. 
Among the hardships was economic discrimination. The Irish encounter a similar 
position in Northern cities when they started to look for work. Signs were held up in 
buildings saying ―NINA‖, No Irish Need Apply. While there was no law passed not 
allowing the employment of Irish workers, some could not find a ways of supporting 
themselves. Californians used political economic racism on Mexicans when they started 
to become wealthy prior to the Asians. No matter the race, white Californians turn to the 

















Chapter Two: The Chinese Question: From the Gold Rush to Exclusion, 
1848 – 1882  
In 1848 James Marshall discovered gold in California, propelling the region into a 
transformation of rapid growth. Immigrants from all across the globe flocked to the future 
state to stake a claim. Among this group, the Chinese went from being one of the most 
welcomed groups to being the subject of several laws designed to impede their progress, 
both economically and materially.
22
 What happened in California from 1850 – 1882 
became nothing short of political-economic racism: an attempt to economically exclude a 
particular ethnic group through the political process. In order for this to occur, the masses 
become convinced a minority group threaten their way of life and the political process is 
the only available course of action. Californian‘s systemic effort to undermine its Chinese 
immigrants, through political-economic racism, eventually resulted in the Exclusion Act 
of 1882. 
 As merchant traders carried word the following year of the discovery of gold in 
the U.S., the Chinese government welcomed the news and allowed its citizens to leave 
because overpopulation became an issue. The allure and attraction of California 
stimulated many but most could not afford to make the journey. In order to make the trip, 
Chinese middlemen, who carried no government affiliation, paid for their trip and in 
exchange they kept the immigrants‘ earnings until they paid them off. The Six 
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Companies, who established themselves in California, typically made these loans.
23
 
Although many historians refer to this as ―debt peonage,‖ it did not dissuade many on the 
prospect of becoming rich overnight and returning to China.
24
 Years of poor farming 
conditions from the Yangtse floods, many farmers from the Kwangtung (Guangdong) 
Province in the Pearl River Delta region, departed from Hong Kong to the U.S. with no 
mining experience or training. The Taiping Rebellion (1851 – 64) and the Hakka-Punti 
War also caused immigration waves to America as well as internal struggle from the 
opium trade.
25
            
 Although few in numbers, Chinese women appeared at the start of the gold rush 
and generally became prostitutes once in America. The Chinese viewed their daughters as 
an economic commodity because the son inherited everything. In 1849, Ah Toy became 
San Francisco‘s most famous prostitute. Despite being illegal, American obsession with 
exotic women brought over females such as Ah Toy across the Pacific to make money 
and she became an exception to every rule. She spoke fluent English and charged an 
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ounce of gold dust just to look at her.
26
 Her occupation led her to court over the next few 
years over various issues. But as male Chinese businessmen brought in more prostitutes 
and expanded throughout the state, some women, such as Ah Toy, took a new role as 
wife.
27
 Elmer Sandmeyer‘s The Anti-Chinese Movement in California (1991) draws upon 
various accounts from immigrants. He discussed how the majority of women brought to 
the state came as prostitutes. For women this was their ―debt peonage.‖ The authorities 
looked the other way for prostitutes in general. The state passed the Page Law of 1875 in 
order to stop Chinese women from entering but a network still brought them in.
28
 In 
1866, California enacted a law designed to limit Chinese prostitution to certain 
geographic areas. The state attempted in 1870 to prohibit Chinese prostitutes from 
entering by fining captains of ships bringing them in. Despite the prospect of the state 
commissioner of immigration keeping part of the fines and the request of help on the 
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In the two years since the discovery of gold, only 500 Chinese miners operated in 
California, and 1,000 Chinese people landed in the U.S. As the Chinese began to arrive 
by the boatloads white miners sensed they followed in the footsteps of Mexican labor.
30
 
In 1851, over a twenty-four hour period, more than 1,000 Chinese landed in San 
Francisco looking for the chance to strike it rich. The following year, 20,000 Chinese 
went to California heading for the mining towns.
31
 Once in America, the Six Companies 
oversaw the immigrants, making sure they did not flee back to China or elsewhere to 
escape their debt. The Californian government allowed them to associate with authorities 
to enforce contracts. The Six Companies frequently served as an un-official part of the 
government in this capacity. Most of the new arrivals intended to return to China once 




As the Chinese emigrants flooded into California, the state already began preparations of 
its discriminatory policy towards them. In 1850, the state enacted the Foreigner Miners 
Tax, which required non-U. S. miners to purchase a licensing fee of $20 a month.  
Originally, the tax targeted Mexicans, and roughly 10,000 of them left the state. Although 
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the state repealed the law the following year, it soon needed another one to combat the 
growth of the Chinese immigrants.
33
 The allure of the gold mines led to whites avoiding 
regular work and California needed cheap labor in order to keep pace with the boom 
taking place. One state senator introduced legislation to fix the wages of Chinese workers 
for durations of ten years or less through a system of contract labor. Newspapers cried 
foul, and one legislator submitted a report against the law.
34
 In the 1850s, the emergence 
of companies replaced individuals working on placer mines. Banks lowered interest rates, 
encouraging more claims, and explosives reached the west coast, making mining more 
dangerous for the individual. These two factors led people to join companies.
35
 Daniel 
Cornfold‘s We All Live More like Brutes than Humans: Labor and Capital in the Gold 
Rush (1998), looks at Rodman Paul‘s California Gold (1947) as the modern study and 
examines the sources used. Cornfold acknowledged that although data estimating miner‘s 
wages was shaky, the wage of the miners decreased from $20 per day in 1848 to $3 per 
day by the mid 1850s. Even though the cost of living went down as well, white miners 
typically blamed the Chinese immigrants for the decline. Although both works are labor-
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In 1851 the Chinese developed two huiguan, or districts associations, in San Francisco. 
These organizations comprised of people who spoke similar dialect back in China. 
Several more companies developed over time and they eventually became known as the 
Six Companies. The Six Companies provided a variety of support such as legal assistance 
once immigrants adjusted to life in America.
37
 
 The anti-Chinese movement began the following year as white miners attempted to 
exclude Chinese from mining at several sites throughout the state.
38
 But the new tax 
stemming from the protest from white miners became dwarfed by one state legislator‘s 
comments:  
―The time is not far distant when absolute prohibition of entry will be necessary for our 
own protection…. We respectfully recommend that the attention of Congress shall be 
called to this subject, and that we forward to our own Representatives instructions to seek 
a remedy at the hands of the Federal Government by proper treaty provisions… 
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determining here at home to exercise the right of our State sovereignty, and protect 
ourselves should necessity demand.‖
39
 
The white miners mustered enough political strength to impose a new levy against them 
that previously attacked Mexicans for similar reasons. This tariff initially started at $3 but 
later rose to $4. This became the first of several targeted pieces of legislation aimed at the 
Chinese. This tax became a large revenue generator for the state since the Chinese paid 
the majority of the taxes, and in some counties the tax provided 50% of the income. Even 
as the governor called upon the state legislature to limit Chinese immigration, collectors 
of the tax often killed Chinese immigrants when they failed to pay, and the collectors 
rarely faced reprimand.
40
 Eighty-eight Chinese men died as a result of failure to pay the 
tax; only two officers were convicted of a crime.
41
 
In 1852 and 1853, the state legislature passed a law requiring each ship to post a $500 fee 
for its passengers. Ships passed the cost along to the passengers and each paid a share of 
the $500 and the amount varied by the number of people onboard. By 1855, a new 
ordinance passed mandating each passenger aboard a ship pay $50, and in 1858 a new 
law prohibited Chinese and Mongolians entering California at all. Although the state 
Supreme Court declared both laws unconstitutional, the atmosphere started to lean 
towards exclusion, and by the end of the 1850s, several counties wrote laws prohibiting 
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Chinese in their by-laws.
42
 California attempted to exclude the Chinese three years later 
and threatened fines and jail time of anyone convicted for bringing them into the state.
43
 
 During the beginning of the Chinese question in California, several local 
newspapers asked their readers to consider the economic consequences of either taxing 
Chinese miners or forcing them out entirely. Mining communities benefited from the 
revenue generated by the immigrants in the form of schools and hospitals. The Auburn 
Herald put it bluntly saying ―expel the Chinamen and Bankrupt the State. We do not 
believe it practicable or desirable that the Chinamen shall be expelled.‖
44
 In the early 
1850s, the governor insisted that the legislature look into curbing the growing Asian 
immigration to make sure the state kept the gold in the country. White miners often 
viewed Chinese labor as a form of slavery and they frequently claimed the Chinese 
lowered the standard of living for everyone.
45
 The state committee of Mines and Mining 
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issued a report stating the state revenue was dependent upon the Chinese.
46
 Sacramento 
County, the second largest Chinese enclave and yet one of the most anti-Chinese 
communities, received $1,200 a month from the foreigner miners tax.
47
 By March 1855, 




Of all the different types of mining, river mining started as the primary method of 
extracting gold in California with the American River being one of the first sites. 
However, heavy rains forced many whites to abandon this idea after they turned up 
empty. This led to the Chinese moving in and taking over areas such as the Yuba River at 
the beginning of 1852. Companies generally contained twenty-five to fifty men, and 
within a few years they controlled several mining streams. In 1857, the Sacramento 
Union noticed the wealth the immigrants earned in these mining operations and their 
ability to successfully invest money. The following two years saw even more Chinese 
move into the industry as white miners flocked to other sites. With one site pulling in 
$40,000 a week, the individual Chinese immigrant possessed large amounts of territory 
entering the 1860s. Water companies built irrigation systems on placer mine sites in order 
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to control the flow of water.  Placer mines are sites located in rivers or streams, and by 
charging high fees for the control of water, these companies fell victim to strikes by white 
miners. White miners retaliated against Chinese miners because they believed the 
Chinese weakened their position. Having drained the Merced River by 1861, several 
newspapers commented on the work of the Chinese and their ability to accomplish a great 
deal without using machinery. They frequently worked areas that previous owners 
believed to be dry or un-workable. In one such instance, a Chinese company leased an 
area for three thousand dollars and left with a significant amount of gold.
49
  
Gold was not the only industry the Chinese sought to make a living; they also went on to 
found California‘s salt-water fishing industry. With four chief areas of operation, the 
greatest camp resided in San Francisco Bay. After the Foreigner Miner‘s Tax in 1854, 
some Chinese entered the industry having failed at mining. In 1860, the state legislature 
passed a law taxing Chinese fishermen $4 a month. The levy caused an exodus of 
fishermen, and the loss of revenue led to its repeal in 1864. During the 1870s, a 
conservation wave swept across the U. S., especially among regulatory agencies. In 1880, 
the state attempted to exclude the Chinese all-together from fishing as the anti-Chinese 
rhetoric reached its shores. Whites, along with other Caucasian groups, wanted to remove 
the Chinese from fishing areas. Although ruled un-constitutional, the state tried to 
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prohibit the Chinese from earning a living.
50
 Although the courts struck down laws they 
found unconstitutional, the police force in general lacked the courts‘ enthusiasm when 
helping Chinese immigrants. Before the California State Senate, George Duffield, a 
Sacramento police officer, believed, the Chinese did not care about the U.S.'s laws and 
customs.
51
 In 1859, Shasta County Sheriffs needed help from the governor to assist in 
controlling a mob that attempted to force the Chinese out of the city. The local newspaper 
advocated for keeping the immigrants in town.
52
 
 From the gold and other natural mineral production came the ever-growing 
demand to better ship products across the U. S. By January 1853, the senate heard the 
calls of a Pacific railroad subsidy bill by Senator William Gwin. Although his calls for a 
transcontinental railroad fell on deaf ears, Californians soon rejoiced as Republicans took 
control of the White House and Congress in 1860. With a solid Republican majority, 
Californians saw their dreams come true as President Abraham Lincoln signed the Pacific 
Railroad bill into law. The 1862 and 1864 bills provided substantial amounts of federal 
assistance for the construction of the railroad. As the gold rush era ended, the Chinese 
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began to look for work elsewhere.
53
 The Central Pacific Railroad, owned by white 
Californians, issued calls for thousands of white laborers, only to receive a lukewarm 
response and they turned to the Six Companies to bring in workers. Shortly after 
construction began on the railroad, the Irish workers pressed for higher pay.
54
 Charlie 
Crocker decided to try Chinese for the railroad after one of his assistants suggested to try 
them since the labor pool diminished with each passing day. The government paid his 
company handsomely for each mile of track laid, and the corporation faced falling behind 
because workers threatened to strike. One of Crocker's top assistants commented how the 
Chinese built the Great Wall; therefore, they could do railroad construction.
55
 Although 
the Chinese usually broke strikes, they became preferred as the Irish and other white 
employees generally quit once having earned enough money. In the last few years of 
railroad construction, the Chinese competed against each other for jobs as more skilled 
Chinese looked for work, which led to various strikes. By the time construction of the 
railroad finished in 1869, the Central Pacific employed mostly Chinese.
56
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In the 1860s, white owners of cigar businesses ended a boycott of hiring Chinese, and by 
the start of the following decade they rolled the majority of cigars in San Francisco. The 
cigar industry employed more Chinese as the years passed in order to keep costs down as 
a way to compete with manufactures on the east coast. To help boost sales, white cigar 
distributors issued a special stamp acknowledging white male workers made the product, 
and the California State Legislature supported the notion. Despite the attempt of being a 
company that employed only whites, several workers testified their companies hired 
Chinese.
57
 One factory owner commented how finding good young workers became 
difficult. They frequently worked poorly or ran off to do other things. He proclaimed, 
―You take a Chinaman, a green China boy, into your factory and show him just how to do 
a thing, and if you leave him and come back, it is a year afterward, you find him doing 
the work precisely as you instructed him.‖
58
 
The Chinese entered the agriculture labor market by the 1870s in Sacramento and San 
Joaquin counties. Within a decade, some white landowners employed Chinese as land 
tenants. Some grew fruit trees and until the trees matured, the owners charged a small 
rent. When the trees bore fruit, the rent increased due to the ability to sell the fruit for 
profit. By the 1880s, agriculture became one of the leading economic industries for the 
state and the Chinese. Large scale farms needed seasonal help and with the immigrants 
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The 1870s brought a whirlwind of change to Californians as the state, and several cities 
passed laws against the Chinese. These included ―minimum lodging space laws, bans or 
taxes on use of poles to carry laundry or vegetables, bans on the wearing of queues 
(braids), prohibitions from owning land, and prohibitions on being hired from municipal 
works.‖
60
 In previous decades the Republicans condemned those who wanted to 
physically force the Chinese from the state. But by the 1870s, the economic climate made 
the party change its tune and started to move towards exclusion.
61
 In 1871 in Amador 
County, a strike broke out as the company decided to cut wages. They slashed the wage 
down to $2 per day and shortly after the protest began. The ―Amador War‖ became the 
Amador County Laborer‘s Association with its four hundred members versus their 
employer. The group wanted an increase in pay and to prohibit Chinese employment with 
the company as much as possible. The union achieved its pay increase but failed to limit 
                                                          
59
 Sucheng Chan, ―Chinese Livelihood in Rural California: The Impact of Economic Change, 1860-1880,‖ 
The Pacific Historical Review, 53.3 (Aug., 1984): 293 – 294.  
60
 Terry E. Boswell, ―A Split Labor Market Analysis of Discrimination Against Chinese Immigrants, 1850-
1882,‖ American Sociological Review, 51.3 (June 1986): 364. 
61
 Cheryl L. Cole, ―Chinese Exclusion: The Capitalist Perspective of the Sacramento Union, 1850-1882,‖ 





As the Panic of 1873 swept into the west, San Francisco approved a 
measure taxing Chinese laundries with 1) $2.00 quarterly for laundry employing one 
horse-drawn vehicle; 2) $4.00 quarterly for laundries employing two or more vehicles; 3) 
$15.00 quarterly for laundries employing no vehicles.
63
 The economic recession left 
many whites without work even though the Chinese possessed jobs. The downturn 
combined with drought in 1876 – 77 hurt agriculture and ―the Chinese again became the 
scapegoats for the difficult economic situation.‖
64
 With the completion of the railroad, 
east coast manufactures brought their products out west. This led to a decline in wages 
and the formation of ―anti-coolie‖ clubs to combat Chinese labor.
65
  
Most of the Chinese who went to America wanted to acquire large sums of money with 
the purpose of buying their family out of tenant farming in China. The average wage in 
California was $30 a month, in which case an immigrant could pay off his debt in a 
matter of a few months, profit the rest after the debt was paid, and then return to China 
with a healthy amount. The Californian government enacted other laws specifically 
targeting the Chinese. The state charged the Chinese a Hospital Tax with when such 
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services were not available to them. A Laundry Tax became imposed on the Chinese, 
charging $15 if one did not use a vehicle for the purposes of collecting and delivery 
laundry. The charge became less if one used a vehicle to obtain laundry.
66
 
 California was not the only place that suffered from Chinese labor strikes. In the 
fall of 1874 in Rock Springs, Wyoming, coal miners of the Union Pacific wanted a wage 
increase to go along with the increase in demand of coal. The governor visited the town 
and asked the men not to strike, which set to take place in a few days. After the 
governor's comments, a negotiator told the crowd that the company intended to bring 
Chinese into the mines they worked if a strike occurred. Prior to the deadline, Union 
Pacific official sent a request for Chinese labor in case the situation was not resolved. In 
early November, around 500 miners at two sites walked off the job and encouraged other 
miners in the area to do the same. The mood turned ugly as the union picketed the mines 
after the company paid laid-off workers off. Governor John Thayer sent troops to Rock 
Springs to protect the mines and company employees. The workers requested a meeting 
with the governor and he became less sympatric to their cause. Thayer intended on 
leaving troops in the city for as long as possible.
67
 
 As the strike continued, the governor returned to Rock Springs, only this time he 
brought Chinese strikebreakers with him. Thayer warned the workers the U. S. Army 
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40 
 
would enforce law and order if violence erupted. Union Pacific posted a list of employees 
eligible to return to work, the others needed to leave town within two days. As the miners 
angrily left town, the Chinese went to work in the mines. The company became quickly 
satisfied at their rate of progress and how pleased they appeared to be working in the 
mine. Union Pacific sent word to the governor‘s office thanking him for his continued 
support. The strike may have been over in Rock Springs but resentment toward the 
Chinese lingered. The company routinely gave them the best rooms to operate in, leaving 
white miners left to the more dangerous rooms. White miners routinely shifted between 
rooms in favor of Chinese. Union Pacific closed a mine and refused to offer employment 
to any of its white employees; the Chinese however, quickly received work, leaving some 
white miners without work for months.
68
 
Violence against the Chinese became a common occurrence as the economy went down. 
In 1871, fifteen Chinese hung in the streets of Los Angeles following riots, and twenty-
five Chinese businesses burned to the ground in 1877. The movement reached its boiling 
point as even bigger riots took place in the months ahead.
69
 In late July 1877, San 
Francisco became the epicenter of the anti-Chinese movement as a white mob attacked a 
crowd in San Francisco‘s ―Chinatown.‖ 10,000 San Franciscans shouted ―Death to the 
capitalist‖ as they assaulted Chinese.
70
 The Workingmen‘s Party of California (WPC) 
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started to organize in the wake of the riots throughout the city. The community told 
countless stories of women being the victim of Chinese labor and having to go into 
prostitution. The story of Mary Wollaston became a common occurrence. Her family lost 
the farm due to floods, and when her father passed away, she left for the city to find 
work. Wollaston found a job, only to be replaced by less expensive Chinese workers.
71
 
 The WPC and a San Francisco newspaper sensationalized her story, along with 
others, to show how white women, as well as white men, found themselves pushed out of 
the labor market by Chinese immigrants.
72
 Although women did work with Chinese, 
companies frequently separated the two from one other.
73
 With the onset of the 
depression sweeping across the nation in the mid-1870s, many companies turned to 
immigrant labor. For women that meant being squeezed out of an already decreasing job 
market. As Chinese immigrants entered the shirt industry, wages fell from $1.25 to $1.00. 
Although the completion of the transcontinental railroad brought more competition from 
the northeastern states, the depression, coupled with Chinese immigrants, lowered wages. 
Even though women could not vote or join labor unions, California Senator Aaron 
Sargent in 1876 stated, ―[the Chinese] has taken labor from women—such work as gave 
them honest and virtuous independence, and has driven too many of them to resort to 
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practices of shame and guilt.‖
74
 The WPC was not the only force directly behind the anti-
Chinese movement. The Knights of Labor, along with The Truth, a pro-labor newspaper, 
published articles in support of the cause. The National Labor Union had supported 
exclusion in 1870, and the Industrial Congress and Industrial Brotherhood followed suit 
in 1874. Unions as far away as New England advocated limiting Chinese immigration.
75
 
By the end of the decade the San Francisco Evening Bulletin described how the business 
class began to change its opinion: ―the merchants have been the last to realize it but I 
think that nearly all of them understand now that their business is falling off because the 
laboring man cannot earn money to buy.‖
76
 
 In Working on White Womanhood: White Working Women in the San Francisco 
Movement, 1877-1890 (1999), Martha Mabie Gardner writes about the similar tones 
historians use when generalizing the anti-Chinese movement. Drawing conclusions based 
upon the Workingmen‘s Party of California‘s documents and newspapers, she illustrates 
the women‘s involvement before and after the Exclusion Act. Gardner describes how the 
many Mary Wollaston‘s stories became a vehicle for which the white male working class 
to protect itself to get the Chinese excluded from the U. S. The white males took the 
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articles and exaggerated them to appear to be an everyday occurrence.
77
 Denis Kearney 
became one of the influential leaders behind the cause leading the WPC. He ended each 
speech with ―the Chinese must go!‖ This party sent 50 delegates to the state‘s 
constitutional convention and became a major player at the table.
78
  
Section two of the new Constitution affirmed ―No corporation now existing or hereafter 
formed under the laws of this State, shall, after the adoption of this Constitution, employ, 
directly or indirectly, in any capacity, any Chinese or Mongolian. The Legislature shall 
pass such laws as may be necessary to enforce this provision.‖
79
 He wanted to drive the 
Chinese out of California by any means possible. In 1878, he told a crowd in San 
Francisco, if weapons fail to drive away the Chinese the ballot box will.
80
 Kearney 
generally promoted his cause every Sunday in sand lots across California and on an east 
coast trip, he met with the president and promoted WPC party‘s policies.
81
  
The clergy in California became the main ally of the Chinese. They viewed the 
immigrants not as labor servants but rather as people to convert to Christianity. As the 
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mood turned sour and violence broke out in several cities against the immigrants, the 
church attempted to make its voice louder. It opposed the 1877 Shelly bill making its way 
through congress. The proposal called for a $250 head tax as a way to restrict Chinese 
immigration. Although not all members of the cloth embraced the Chinese, the church 




 For the election of 1867 both political parties adopted policies against Chinese 
citizenship. In 1870, several labor union sent a warning to the leaders of the Six 
Companies stating they believed it no longer safe for the Chinese to keep coming to 
America.
83
 By 1876, the politics of discrimination showed at all levels throughout the 
government. The two major parties gave their stance on where they stood with the 
Chinese question. The Democrats favored exclusion while the Republicans wanted to 
study the effects of Chinese immigration. Each party appealed to its base in order to 
increase the chances of winning. In October and November 1876, a special Senate 
Committee held meetings in San Francisco to publicly discuss the Chinese situation. One 
of the state‘s U. S. Senators, A. A. Sargent, chaired the panel after the death of Senator 
Oliver Morton, who defended the Chinese. Sargent wrote the group‘s majority report 
urging Congress for the exclusion of Chinese laborers into the country. Although the 
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Senator took shots at Chinese women, claiming all entered as prostitutes, laboring men 
became his focus, and he declared in his report: 
―The Chinese have reduced wages to what would be starvation prices for white men and 
women, and engrossed so much of the labor in various callings that there is a lack of 
employment for whites; and young men are growing up in idleness, while young women, 
willing to work, are compelled to resort to doubtful means of support.‖
84
 
The official spokesman of San Francisco said: 
―The burden of our accusation against them is that they come in conflict with our labor 
interest; that they can never assimilate with us; that they are a perpetual, unchanging, and 
unchangeable alien element that can never become homogenous; that their civilization is 
demoralizing and degrading to our people; that they degrade and dishonor labor; that they 
can never become citizens, and that an without interest in the country it inhabits, is an 




The Joint Select Committee noted the Chinese paid nearly $14 million in taxes each year 
and have contributed greatly in the economic development of the state. Despite the 
financial advantages, the state legislature assembly sent the congress a memorial detailing 
how undesirable the Chinese appeared throughout the state.
86
 With Republican 
Rutherford B. Hayes winning the election, a congressional commission investigated the 
effects of the Chinese and found that California benefited from their presence 
economically. This report did little to dampen the growing mood on the west coast and 
throughout the nation. In December 1877, the Six Companies testified in San Francisco 
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before a special joint house and senate Committee to defend Chinese immigration to 
America. The Congress questioned various people from different backgrounds about all 
aspects of the Chinese. The Rev. Otis Gibson went before the committee and held 
―After an experience of about twenty years among this people, [the Chinese] I do not 
hesitate to express my opinion that in simple brain power and possibilities of culture, the 
Chinese race is equal to any other people in the world. They are capable of learning our 
language, laws, customs, principles of government, our theories and practices. We know 
nothing which the Chinese are incapable of learning.‖
87
 
Benjamin S. Brooks, whose Chinese family emigrated to the U. S. during the Gold Rush, 
testified how the Irish facilitated anti-Chinese legislation. On paper, the anti-foreigner 
laws in California went against everyone, but the Chinese became the sole victims of the 
laws. Soloman Heydenfeldt, a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 
California, told the Congress California benefited from the presence of Chinese labor. 
Cornellis B.S. Gibbs, an adjuster of marine losses, described the Chinese as honorable, 
educated, and very good businessmen.
88
 
Three years after commission ended, the house passed a bill allowing for only fifteen 
Chinese people, per year, to enter the U. S. The senate agreed with their house colleagues 
and went even further by advocating America leave Articles V and VI of the Burlingame 
Treaty. Article V of the treaty allowed free emigration of Chinese and American citizens 
to each other‘s country. Article VI gave citizens privileges while they traveled abroad to 
China or to the U. S. The Chinese viewed such potential changes as a detriment to the 
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negotiations of a new accord. Hayes cited the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, mentioning 
America held rights in China because of it; he vetoed the bill. Although he stopped the 
measure, Hayes went to work on his own form of immigration control and wrote in his 
diary ―that such an invasion [of Chinese workers] can not permanently override our 
people. It cannot safely be admitted into the bosom of our American society.‖
89
 
Hayes sent a committee to Beijing in August 1880 to address the immigration issue 
directly with the Chinese. Although they disliked existing accords, they wanted to leave 
the Burlingame Treaty intact and became open to limiting certain types of people for 
emigration. By  November 8 the two sides reached an agreement that allowed the U. S. to 
―regulate, limit, or suspend‖ Chinese immigration but not fully exclude them.  Shortly 
after Hayes signed the treaty, Congress went to work on drafting legislation to override 
the president. By 1882, Chester A. Arthur occupied the White House and faced the 
ultimate question on Chinese immigration. The house approved a twenty-five year 
suspension of Chinese laborers. In the buildup to the bill‘s passage, ―anti-Chinese racism 
was a important rhetorical tool that members of Congress returned to again and again in 
making the case for exclusion.‖
90
 The president vetoed the bill on similar grounds that 
Hayes blocked the measure. Congress amended the bill and passed a new exclusion law 
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that prohibited most Chinese from entering for a ten-year period. Arthur caved in to the 
political pressure and signed the bill.
91
 
 Long before California entered the Union, the region exhibited the similar 
characteristics to the future state. Spanish and Mexican settlers frequently pursued 
discriminatory policies against Native Americans. The Chinese arrived and, in the 
beginning, things went well. Then, white miners wanted them out the mines, out of the 
shorelines, off the railroad, and out of business and legislation became the only way to 
combat the belief of the Chinese dominating the economic state of affairs or ―Yellow 
Peril‖.  In contrast to the population of Chinese, in 1860 Germans totaled 21,646, the 
Irish 33,147, while the Chinese reached 34,935. By 1870, the Germans totaled 29,699, 
the Irish 54,421, the Chinese 48,790, yet it is the latter that faced the most prejudice. 
Historian Isabella Black wrote, ―They attacked the Chinese on economic, political, and 
racial grounds.‖
92
 Historian Terry Boswell concluded: 
―The lack of widespread competition between whites and Chinese outside the west, along 
with the attention paid to relatively minor conflicts, suggest that naturalization of the anti-
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Ultimately, California‘s economic discrimination against its Chinese immigrants led to 













Chapter Three: The Chinese Question: From Exclusion to Acceptance, 1882 – 1943 
On May 6
 
1882, Chester A. Arthur signed the Exclusion Act prohibiting Chinese labor 
immigration for ten years. Labor unions along with their political allies achieved an 
objective that many desired. This piece of legislation, however, led to unintended 
50 
 
consequences California, where the anti-Chinese movement started, throughout the 
country. The purpose of this chapter is to showcase the effects of the Exclusion Act and 
how a combination of race, politics, and economics dominated the reasons as to why it 
took until World War II to repeal it. 
After the act passed women quickly faced discrimination because Congress never 
discussed women. Secretary of Treasury Charles Folger, who enforced the Exclusion Act, 
believed women carried the status of a ―laborer‖ if husband was so categorized. 
Overlooked by the legislative branch, Chinese immigrant women were believed to be 
prostitutes.
94
 Although some women fit the definition of a laborer, wives generally did 
not. The notion of an independent woman coming to America seemed remote. Chinese 
men often returned to China to marry, only to return to America with wife in hand. Since 
these women did not possess a return certificate, immigration frequently denied their 
entry into the country.
95
 The Chinese went to work to find ways around the law, and the 
most commonly used approached was the ―slot‖ system in which one claimed to be the 
son of a Chinese immigrant already in country; these laborers became known as ―paper 
sons.‖  The San Francisco earthquake in 1906 further helped people in this cause because 
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the ensuing fire destroyed many records. Claiming to be a student or a tourist became 
another widely used method around the law.
96
  
After the Exclusion Act, businesses in the U. S. sought out the Six Companies with the 
intention of bringing Chinese into the country for temporary work. Although illegal, 
companies needed help to complete projects or for seasonal work and hired the 
immigrants for specific jobs such as mining or agriculture. Prior to the Exclusion Act, 
businesses sent request through the Six Companies for perhaps up to hundreds of men for 
work. The U. S. government suspended big businesses main supply of labor but not the 
desire for companies to do work cheaply, thus smuggling immigrants into the U. S. 
became their solution. Relying on a different variety of groups, sneaking Chinese across 
the border from Mexico and Canada became a booming enterprise.
97
 
In order to help combat the ever-growing tide of immigration into the country, in 
February 1903, the U. S. released special inspectors of the Justice Department of their 
duties, and handed them over to commissioner general of immigration in the Department 
of Labor and Commerce. Five years later, the Immigration Service created the China 
Division in order to stop the flow of illegal immigration along the border with Mexico. 
Despite being few in numbers, these ―Chinese inspectors‖ patrolled areas along the Rio 
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Grande and along the railways. Also in the interior, some smugglers developed relations 
with U. S. customs officials allowing for an easier transition of the immigrants into the 
country. Smugglers received anywhere from $5 to $25 per person getting the immigrants 
across the border and as much as $40 to $50 if the group they led got to a particular 
destination. America decided to toughen up its border security and as a result, the fees 
immigrants needed to pay in order to cross into the U. S. went up.
98
 
During the 1880s smugglers used the railroad and the towns of El Paso and Ciudad 
Juarez became the focal point of their operations. Operating an ―underground railroad,‖ 
these stations took immigrants to destinations ranging from New York to San Francisco. 
The railroad carried the bulk of the load until 1905 when U. S. Immigration Service 
stepped up its surveillance along the border near El Paso. Roughly 35,000 to 40,000 
Chinese arrived in Mexico prior to 1910; however, the Mexican census claims only 13, 
203 in the country. The Six Companies established a presence in the country for the sole 
purpose of helping the Chinese immigrants better make the adjustment to life in America. 
Prior to landing in Mexico, the Six Companies taught the immigrants some English and 
knowledge about American culture and traditions. Once they entered the U. S. the Six 
Companies gave them jobs in the fields in which they worked to better facilitate their 
transition.
99
         In 1912 
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several members involved in the smuggling operation were arrested, and immigration 
officials deported the Chinese who had attempted to sneak across the border. Although 
these incidents rarely happened once the Chinese landed safely at their destination and 
blended into society local authorities grew powerless to determine one‘s legal status. The 
U. S. contacted Mexican officials about the influx of Chinese residents in their country. 
Mexico informed America its Constitution allowed the Chinese to enter and they did not 
monitor the Chinese as they moved about the country.  In 1916, the smugglers‘ 
suspended operations as the U. S. launched an invasion into Mexico to chase after 
General Villa following his attack in New Mexico. The activities picked up again a short 
time later; however, very few operations occurred due to the German U-Boat presence. In 
1921 America enacted the Quota Law heavily restricting the number of immigrants by 
country and region. The law resulted in an increase of the number of Europeans wanting 
to enter the country through Mexico illegally. This only lasted a few years because 
congress created the Border Patrol in 1924 to combat the growing flow of illegal Mexican 
immigration; An issue that lingers to the present day. The Great Depression ended the run 
of smuggling Chinese into the U. S. With high unemployment all throughout the country, 
and businesses closing doors, nobody needed Chinese labor. The Six Companies 
dedication to the Chinese over the decades never dropped.
100
   In 
1888 Congress passed the Scott Act prohibiting Chinese workers from reentering the 
country. For years the Chinese fished off California, only to sell their goods in Baja, 
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Mexico, for a final destination to China. The act disallowed the Chinese to continue their 
frequent fishing excursions and returning to the U. S.
101
 On May 5 1892, the Geary Act 
became signed into law under President Grover Cleveland. In addition to extending the 
exclusion act for another ten years, it required all Chinese laborers currently in the U. S. 
to carry a certificate of residence. This document needed to include a photograph as well 
as detailed information pertaining to the individual. The Six Companies sent word to all 
Chinese immigrants not to comply with the law.
102
 In 1894, the Chinese and U. S. 
governments signed the Gresham-Yang treaty adding more immigration restrictions on 
the Chinese.  The Chinese obtained reassurances their citizens ―received‖ protection 
under the laws of the U. S. Congress saw no need to change any of the exclusion, but in 
March 1894, the Chinese protested American restrictions.
103
 The Treasury Department, 
which oversaw all immigration into the country, knew nothing about the Minster‘s 
comments. By August Senator Stephen White of California introduced a new treaty on 
the floor of the Senate. He wanted to enact Section 6 of the Exclusion Act of 1884, 
Section 13 of the Scott Act, and called for ―all shipmasters to furnish list of Chinese 
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persons abroad their vessels upon arrival in the United States.‖
104
 Yang, along with the 
State Department, concluded the proposal violated constitutional rights. A new law also 
appeared requesting to deny the Chinese, who were denied admission, the right to a court 
appeal. Yang objected the latest discriminatory matters aimed at his people.
105
  
         With the treaty of 
Paris in 1898 the U. S. received control of the Philippines as part of concession by Spain. 
Congress established a commission to investigate the status of Chinese on the islands. 
Major-General E. S. Otio, who governed the territory, applied the exclusion laws to the 
Chinese in September. It took a year for the new Chinese Minster, Wu Ting-fang, to find 
out about the decision. By 1902, the U. S. denied entry of Chinese immigrants to territory 
conquered because of the Spanish-American War by enacting the Scott Act. Two years 
after that conflict, the Chinese hoped to terminate the Gresham-Yang treaty in order to 
help ease restrictions. Both sides appeared ready to negotiate a new treaty, but congress 
wanted no part in it as anti-Chinese sentiment remained strong. In 1904, the U. S. 
government extended the exclusion ban indefinitely.
106
     
       Labor unions accomplished their 
                                                          
104
 Ibid, 460. 
105
 Ibid, 460-461. 
106
 Delber L. McKee, ―The Chinese Boycott of 1905-1906 Reconsidered: The Role of Chinese Americans,‖ 
The Pacific Historical Review, 55.2 (May 1986): 172; Duncan, Robert H, ―The Chinese and the Economic 
Development of the Northern Baja California, 1889-1929,‖ The Hispanic American Historical Review, 74.4 
(Nov., 1994): 642. 
56 
 
objective: Chinese exclusion. These groups turned their attention to the Chinese still in 
the country. In the following decades, riots and boycotts of Asians became frequent. One 
of the first of these events happened in Tacoma, Washington, in September 1885. The 
town‘s mayor led a campaign to relocate 700 Chinese residents to San Francisco. Tacoma 
became convinced a population of 700 constituted an economic threat to a city population 
of 40,000. It started in 1884 when a water company hired Chinese labor over white labor 
when unemployment for white males increased due to a sluggish economy in the area. 
This event activated the lingering anti-Chinese sentiment into overdrive. The white 
laboring class attacked the Chinese since they managed to stay afloat during uncertain 
times. The group publicly noted those who refused to participate in their plans.
107
 
In February Mayor R. Jacob Weisbach called for a mass meeting to discuss the struggle 
against the Chinese. During the event, the mayor, along with a real estate agent, 
suggested the town declare Chinese businesses in violation of various health codes and 
then Tacoma could condemn their stores. The clergy recommended segregating the 
Chinese from the population in order to keep the peace. The option to forcibly remove the 
Chinese became publicly discussed. During the summer, the Tacoma Ledger promoted 
anti-Chinese activities. The movement gained strength as Weisbach formed an anti-
Chinese League and they wanted to drive Asians out of their area.
108
 Citizens from the 
town organized a committee discourage Chinese employment and to boycott Chinese 
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businesses. By late September, Weisbach won the election for president of the Paget 
Sound Congress. It soon announced a directive for towns in the area to create committees 
for notifying the Chinese to leave by November 1.
109
 
In early October a rally occurred in Tacoma after they appointed their committee. The 
Ledger reported 500 men marched to protest for the expulsion of the Chinese. However, a 
minster told the Portland Oregonian roughly 325 men attended the event. Cries of ―The 
Chinese must go,‖ reminiscent of the late 1870s in San Francisco began to fill the streets. 
The same committee allegedly threatened the Chinese with harm if they ignored the 
group‘s demand. A prominent farmer in a nearby town become worried about Tacoma‘s 
reputation and warned about the town‘s direction after the march; His concerns soon 
carried weight. On October 6, the chamber of commerce of Tacoma debated three 
different resolutions about removing the Chinese. A well-known lawyer in the area 
approved of removing the Chinese but not by force. He represented wealthy interest who 
wanted the town‘s integrity to remain strong. He also recommended anyone inciting 
violence be arrested. John E. Burns proposed a resolution advocating the lawyer‘s 
sentiments and the Chamber of Commerce approved it by a vote of forty-one to twenty-
two. The editor of the Tacoma News lost his job after two violently laced editorials 
became published. As much as people disliked the Chinese, they wanted a peaceful exit 
for them.          
 Governor Watson Squire kept a watchful eye on the situation and started to 
become involved after a local sheriff sent him a letter requesting additional forces in 
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order to maintain law and order. Weisbach received a similar correspondence and the 
sheriff received additional local reinforcements. Squire later received letters from leading 
Tacoma citizens informing him the situation cooled from previous extremes. The 
governor fell out of favor with the public as newspapers across Washington attacked him. 
He made a trip to Tacoma to curry favor with the locals and before the Chamber of 
Commerce, he stated in a speech, ―[He was] heart and soul with those who wanted to see 
the Chinese leave us and supplant their places with white people… to have territory rid of 
Chinese, and peacefully and lawfully he would go as far as any to accomplish this 
end.‖
110
 Squire returned to the capital only to find an invitation to attend an anti-Chinese 
rally in Tacoma the day before the Chinese needed to leave the city. He declined the 
invite but sent a letter urging a peaceful solution. The Seattle Call hoped Squire‘s career 
in public service would soon end because of the Tacoma affair. By the end of October, 
most of the Chinese inhabitants of Tacoma left without incident.
111
 
On November 2, nearly 500 men, along with additional police units, went to every 
Chinese residence informing them they needed to leave town that day. Although the 
crowd used imitation tactics by using a show of force, no violence ensued. The governor 
sent word to the Secretary of the Interior L. Q. C. Lamar of the incident, and he 
previously told the Chinese consul about the upcoming dismissal of Chinese from the 
town. The town soon rejoiced for several days as their Chinese resident now lived 
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elsewhere. Their joy, however, ended rather quickly as members of the town faced legal 
issues stemming from the removal.
112
     
 Another major incident occurred in 1897 as the small town of Butte, Montana, 
organized a boycott of mainly Chinese but also Japanese labor throughout the city. The 
town ordered the Chinese to leave in 1884 and it failed to gain support. By 1890 the town 
contained one of the largest Chinatown‘s in the Rocky Mountain area. The labor unions 
tried before in 1891-1892 to drive the Asian immigrants away from the city. Their 
boycott then proved to be un-successful as many more Chinese flocked to the area in 
search of work. But as the effects of the economic downturn in 1893 lingered across the 
country, many of the residents not just in Butte, but people throughout the nation, blamed 
the Chinese for the economy going south.
113
 
The Chinese first arrived in Montana in the 1860s during the state‘s gold rush. By the 
start of 1870, more than 2,000 Chinese lived in the state. In addition to working the 
mines, the Chinese also worked in restaurants and laundry facilities. The Chinese 
community began to grow in Butte causing resentment among the white laboring class. 
The labor unions supported immigration restriction believing it made the state 
economically competitive and socially made the city more attractive as the Chinese 
numbers decreased. The Hotel and Restaurant Keepers, along with the Cooks and Waiters 
Assembly, started another boycott aimed at the Chinese and the businesses that employed 
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them. Together they created a small committee to develop and fund a boycott in order to 
drive the Chinese away.
114
 The group held meetings to discuss options having 
remembered the previous boycott failed. As word of a possible boycott spread other labor 
joined the cause even though their industries employed no Chinese.
115
 
The editor of the Butte Sunday Bystander affirmed that the goal of the boycott was to 
secure a good wage for the white man. The Silver Bow Trades and Labor Assembly 
endorsed the boycott on January 13, 1897. P. H., Burns, President of the organization, 
wrote in a newspaper article:  
―America vs. Asia, progress vs. retrogression, are the considerations now involved. 
American manhood and American womanhood must be protected from competition with 
these inferior races and further invasions of industry and further reductions of the wages 




The Silver Bow Trades and Labor Assembly now turned their attention to winning over 
hearts and minds of the residents of Butte. One of the ways they attempted to accomplish 
this involved showing people the community to help out women. The Hotel and 
Restaurant Keepers Union embraced this notion and mentioned how women started to 
drift towards prostitutions as a means to support themselves because the Chinese took 
jobs away from them. The Bystander continued to print stories justifying the boycott and 
encouraged people to join in. Anti-Chinese propaganda littered the streets as organizers 
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attempted to highlight the Chinese through misrepresentation. One particular image 
depicted a Chinese baker holding a rat while making bread. Some members of the 
assembly walked around the town telling fellow residents not to use Chinese businesses. 
The owner of a lodging house fired her Chinese cook because of the protest as most of 
her tenants carried union cards. The owner of another lodging establishment, Eva Althoff, 
became victim of the boycott as well. She refused to fire her Chinese workers and sent 
the unions a message not to boycott her business or face financial recourse; she then 
requested police protection. The unions placed pressure on Althoff by getting a local 
grocery store owner to convince her that if she refused to fire the Chinese workers, the 
unions intended on getting the men who leased to her, out of her building. The unions 
also told the tenants if they refused to leave they faced possible firing or their place of 
work could be boycotted. The Bystander declared, ―anyone who opposes anything that is 
no American in its nature as the general boycott against Asiatic races simply put 
themselves in ridiculous light, and the sooner they find this out the better they will be.‖
117
 
Althoff later compromised by agreeing to hire white people in the future and paying the 
union forty-five dollars. Newspapers announced how this agreement became a victory in 
the cause.
118
         The boycott 
claimed many Chinese victims. A once prominent vegetable gardener, who received 
thirty to forty dollars a day, made very few sales. The unions boycotted one of the few 
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doctors in the town because he married a Chinese woman and dealt with Chinese and 
Japanese goods. The walking committee prevented patrons from entering a popular 
Chinese restaurant. The owner, Hum Fay, went to the city for assistance citing how he 
paid his taxes and needed city help. Despite his plea and several more visits his situation 
remained unchanged. Many Chinese employed at various industries lost their jobs as 
unions threatened the companies that employed Chinese. Japanese businesses also faced 
similar stories and nearly 350 Chinese left Butte. On April 16, 1897, Judge Hiram 
Knowles approved a temporary restraining order halting the boycott. The Silver Bow 
Trades and Labor Assembly replied by stating they would obey the court order but 
continued to no longer use Chinese businesses. The case reached the court‘s docket in 
1898, the plaintiffs announced the U. S. and Chinese governments launched 
investigations into the matter. Knowles finally decided the case on May 18, 1900, siding 
with the Chinese.
119
 The boycott movement against the Chinese in America soon faced 
repercussions in the U. S. 
The incidents in Tacoma and Butte motivated Ho Yow, the Imperial Chinese Consul-
General, wrote Chinese Exclusion, A Benefit or a Harm? (1901), nearly twenty years 
after the Exclusion Act passed. He acknowledged the legislative succeeded in limiting 
Chinese immigration to the U. S. The diplomat, however, wrote, ―Bricks and mortar do 
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not comprise the Great Wall which the United States has built against China.‖
120
 The 
political barrier Congress passed drew parallels to one of the Seven Wonders of the 
World. The Chinese built the Great Wall as a defense against invaders Yow argued. 
America‘s response by enacting a bill designed to discriminate against a group who built 
the railroad and respected U. S. laws created discontent in China. The Consul-General 
wanted to know what laws the Chinese broke in order for them to be treated differently 
from other immigrant groups. Yow acknowledged most Chinese intend to return to China 
once they earn enough money.
121
 He accused politicians of fanning the flames of anti-
Chinese rhetoric for their advantage. Yow mentioned how San Francisco, a beacon for all 
of California, seen its glory days fade as its population and commerce drop as trade with 
China dried up. Denis Kearney and his sand-lot crew wanted Chinese exclusion, Yow 
decreed, but at the economic consequences that transpired. Losing hundreds of millions 
to a very big market is not a sound way to conduct business.  He complimented American 
labor and noted Chinese labor ―is not cheap.‖ American machinery produced more goods 
than the Chinese ever could by hand. The Chinese worked predominately in agriculture 
after 1882 as American hired Chinese to work jobs they typically did not do. Yow 
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James D. Phelan, San Francisco‘s mayor at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
responded to Yow‘s article, and warned the Chinese moved east and those states will 
soon experience the Chinese question firsthand. The mayor refuted points made by Yow, 
highlighting the legislative process included ballots in which the masses voted not the 
state legislation. Washington, D. C., even sent an investigation in 1876 to determine the 
effects of Chinese immigration in California. The committee recommended the Exclusion 
Act because the potential for a national panic increased if the Congress ―failed to protect 
the white population of the country.‖
123
 Commerce between the U. S. and China 
increased after the Exclusion Act. The U. S. Consul at Amoy reported a rise in flour, 
tobacco, and other American made products. The mayor noted how a factory attempted to 
employ only white women, only to close its doors as it failed to compete with the 
Chinese because they lived off the bare minimum. Although the Chinese made a living in 
California, their inability to become citizens is a fight often raised. Phelan attacked the 
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Yow and Phelan possessed different viewpoints, but the debate over Exclusion Act also 
continued in China. In Shanghai, China, a U. S. boycott started in August 1905 over the 
immigration issue as the Congress made permanent the temporary provisions in the 1882 
Exclusion Act the year before. The movement spread to Canton, China and even to 
Chinese communities abroad.  The Chinese government no longer tolerated the Exclusion 
law and wanted to find a way to get the U. S. to change its regulations. President 
Theodore Roosevelt wanted a more open immigration reform in order to help commerce 
between the two countries but he understood the difficulty in getting it through the 
Congress. The potential Chinese boycott affected industries across the nation. Asiatic 
Association Secretary John Foord, who campaigned for a new immigration treaty with 
China, sent Roosevelt a telegram expressing businesses looked increasing more nervous 
because of the threat of a boycott.
125
 Roosevelt understood the Chinese position and 
wanted the Congress to act but organized labor enjoyed strong support in both chambers. 
He believed, ―legislative action was ‗needed in our own interest… for it is short sighted 
indeed for us to permit foreign competitors to drive us from the great markets of 
China.‖
126
           
 The Chinese chambers of commerce made it clear a boycott of American goods 
seemed intimate to Foord and the secretary passed the information along to the president. 
The Asiatic Association believed the problem resided in America and if the country 
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changed its immigration laws, specifically altering the language for the definition of a 
laborer, a boycott would be avoided. The San Francisco Chronicle argued the Asiatic 
Association generated the boycott to curry favor for the passage of a new immigration 
treaty with China. The Chinese government took action and instructed its citizens to 
avoid a boycott and despite their request the protest continued. Roosevelt worked with 
advisors to construct a balance for allowing a more open policy for Chinese immigration. 
David Foster introduced the Foster Bill, which changed the definition of a laborer and 
honored Chinese visas for students and businessmen at American ports. Roosevelt 
planned to use armed force if the Chinese became un-willing to end the boycott and sent 
a warship to Shanghai to get the point across.
127
  
On March 14, 1906, business leaders appeared before a house subcommittee to testify 
about the boycott in China. American exports topped more than $58 million in 1905 and 
most of that came from cotton textiles produced in the south.
128
 The American Consul 
told the committee American trade and interest in China became downgraded over the 
boycott issue. After the hearings ended, the Asiatic Association sent more materials over 
to the Congress in support of their position and for the passing of the Foster Bill. 
California Republicans publicly condemned the Foster Bill as part of their re-election 
campaigns. With the chances of the bill passing now remote, the president compromised 
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by adding in amendments regarding the admission of Chinese into the country.
129
 The 
boycott made America aware of how much it was economically dependent upon China as 
a market and it relaxed some of its strict provisions.
130
   The Exclusion 
Act left several loop holes for immigration into the U.S. The Chinese were required to 
produce special certificates for the exempt classes in the Exclusion Act.
131
 The Chinese 
knowledge of the U.S. interrogation system by immigration officials became exceptional 
to the point where they made up villages that never existed to help their case of staying in 
the country. Background checks took weeks because immigration officials verified 
papers with officials in Washington, D. C., and confirmed stories with relatives and 
siblings. If any part of their stories contained inaccurate information, immigration 
officials believed the immigrates‘ story to be false. The Chinese government worked 
together with U. S. immigration officials in order to confirm the validity of stories. Prior 
to 1905, the American consul in Hong Kong confessed as much as 75% of the visas 
issued contained misleading information.
132
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Although immigrations allowed many people into the country, troublesome passports 
rarely affected businesses in San Francisco as the Chinese guilds became influential labor 
unions in their districts. These guilds even collected money to help build a new hospital 
for the community. Gam Yee Hong, one of the most powerful unions during the 1880s, 
attempted to protect its members by falsifying records. In 1896, a disagreement between 
a factory owner and the Bing Lai Guild resulted in the factory being the victim of an 
attempt of arson. Some Chinese labor unions claimed more than 1,000 members. As the 
years went on, union membership decreased as deaths and retirements ensued. To replace 
those workers, women and the emergence of American born Chinese entered the picture. 
Unions went from having more than 1,000, contained around 200 by the mid 1920s. 
Guilds throughout the city became unaware of how weak their positions developed.  The 
leadership of the unions turned conservative by the 1930s and during the Great 
Depression, they frowned upon anti-labor activity. Also, with numbers declining, some 
unions passed resolutions encouraging women to join. The guilds few remaining 
members kept working despite others walking out. In 1938, a union organizer reached out 




As the U. S. entered World War II with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, the enemy 
of America‘s enemy became an ally. As the new Chinese – U. S. partnership ensued the 
Exclusion Act and the prohibition of the Chinese to become American citizens created a 
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diplomatic black eye for America. On February 20, 1943, Representative Martin 
Kennedy of New York introduced a resolution in the house calling for an end to Chinese 
exclusion and to grant them citizenship. Chiang Kai-Shek wrote, ―A people which have 
shared with us the common danger and will share with us the eventual victory, a people 
which have earned our friendship, our gratitude, and our respect, have by the same token 
surely earned our franchise.‖
134
 The Japanese used the exclusion law as part of their 
propaganda against the Allies.
135
 The American Federation of Labor, announced through 
Californian Representative Ward Johnson, they intended to fight the repeal of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act.
136
 To counter, Richard J. Walsh, editor of Asia and American 
magazines, formed the Citizens Committee for Repeal of Chinese Exclusion.
137
 In San 
Francisco, the heart of the anti-Chinese movement for decades, the Board of Supervisors 
urged the Congress to pass a repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act.
138
 On October 8, 1943, 
the House Committee on Immigration passed a resolution in favor of repealing Chinese 
exclusion by a vote of 8 to 4. The bill also limited Chinese immigration to 105 because of 
quotas.
139
 President Franklin Roosevelt pleaded with the Congress to send him an accord, 
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ending Chinese exclusion in America. He regarded it ―as important in the cause of 
winning the war and of establishing a lasting peace.‖
140
 On November 26, 1943, the 




Overall, the effects of the Exclusion Act continued long after Congress passed the act in 
1882. When the economy went bad, the white laboring class feared Chinese immigrants 
as many believed they wanted their job. Next, the group needed to feel secure about their 
surroundings and took steps in order to accomplish this task. Boycotts, based entirely off 
race, became a common trend throughout much of the country. The people accomplished 
the ultimate prize in Chinese exclusion, and their prejudice against the Chinese remained 
deep. It showed as labor unions held firm on supporting renewal and eventual permanent 
exclusion, and as people forced their Chinese residents to leave town. The prejudice 
declined with the Great Depression and World War II as the nation needed allies. The 
Congress moved quickly to repeal the Exclusion Act and right a wrong that lasted 61 
years. The Chinese accomplished equality, on paper at least, and acknowledgment of 
their contributions to American society from the time of the Gold Rush to the present.
142
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Chapter Four: California’s Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 
In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson (1856 – 1924) told a crowd in St. Louis that 
Germany would rebuild its forces and attack Europe again if the United States (U. S.) 
failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.
143
 The same sense of foresight led him to avoid 
fighting California‘s Alien Land Law in 1913. California Governor Hiram Johnson (1866 
– 1945) saw the issue on the level of state‘s rights, and since many other states enacted 
similar laws, a Japanese protest seemed mute.
144
 The Japanese ambassador, Viscount 
Chinda, contested the state legislature.
145
 In the eyes of many Californians, the state 
turned yellow due to the flood of Asian immigrants over the years. The Japanese 
continual success led to white people demanding action to check the immigrants 
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economically and materially. Given the economic and cultural trend of California, 




Dr. J. F. Steiner, who was a resident of Japan and taught at a mission college there, said  
―[that] during the negotiations at Washington in 1913 between Viscount Chinda and the 
Federal Government concerning the California alien land law, the Japanese ambassador 
was given repeated assurances by both the President and the Secretary of State that the 




Dr. T. Iyenaga, professor at the University of Chicago, argued that the situation based 
mainly off race. This chapter will argue that is it a combination of the two: race and 
economics.
148
 What happened in California in 1913 became nothing short of political 
economic racism: an attempt to economically exclude a particular ethnic group through 
the political process. Californians despised the growing success of Japanese farmers, the 
capital they created, the wealth that went with it, and the former found a political way 
that limited their way of life. 
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The Japanese population in California began in 1884 when the Japanese government 
began emigrating its‘ citizens to the U. S.
149
 Within a matter of a few years substantial 
numbers of Japanese immigrants arrived for the first time and during the summer of 1909 
nearly 30,000 worked in agriculture, according to the Immigration Commission.
150
 
During that time they formed groups that supported themselves in a variety of ways, 
creating a sense of community.
151
 All throughout the state, ―Japtowns‖ appeared, just as 
―Chinatowns‖ decades earlier. The Japanese concentrated heavily in a few areas, whereas 
other parts of the state, the likely hood of finding any Japanese decreased. The Chinese 
and Japanese societies often sought each out other because both became looked down 
upon by the heavily dominate white society. In one particular community, after a funeral, 
the Japanese ate at Chinese restaurants. Togetherness over the shared context of 
discrimination in all its various forms between the Chinese and Japanese varied place to 
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In March 1905, Americans still heavily sought Japanese as advertisements called upon 
immigrants to make the trip across the Pacific Ocean.
153
 The population grew so rapidly 
that the census of 1910 failed to accurately count the number of Japanese in the state.
154
 
Multiple reasons as to why the number could be larger includes the San Francisco 
earthquake and fire in 1906 that destroyed most of the city‘s vital records and illegal 
immigration from Canada.
155
 The Japanese brought more than just their culture with 
them, they brought a work ethic that led to economic and discriminatory issues.  
The first wave of Japanese who arrived in the New World at Angel Island, which opened 
in 1910, were called the ―Issei‖ and with low numbers, probably mostly students made 
the trip. But as more landed from Hawaii and Japan, they quickly found a way to support 
themselves by working in agriculture.
156
 When the Japanese first appeared they received 
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joy from the business and farm employers.
157
 Part of the reason for the warm welcome 
started in 1882 when the U. S. passed the Chinese Exclusion Act that created a shortage 
of workers.
158
 Like the Chinese, who worked on the Gold Rush and the transcontinental 
railroad, the Japanese labored longer hours for less pay. But unlike the Chinese, business 
failure for them equaled shame. The Japanese are a strong people and carried with them a 
sense of national pride because the victory over Russia. Fifteen hundred Japanese 
celebrated in Sacramento to show support for their country.
159
 Through hard work the 
Japanese amassed wealth and became the major patrons of Chinese gambling dens 
provided more than $10,000 a year in major cities.
160
 
The money generated by the community led to the Japanese tenants invariably occupied 
more valuable land than their white neighbors. One of the reasons included the fact that 
they paid more for the land they wanted. Among the counties they paid extra for: Orange, 
Sacramento, Solano, and San Joaquin. Bankers profited from advancing credit to the 
Japanese. Other reasons as to why the Japanese flourished with the land they had 
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purchased grew because of their ability to work more efficient.
161
 The Japanese came to 
supply the majority of tomatoes in the Sacramento area and worked crops that required 
special care.
162
 With the growing Japanese success, many Californians latched onto the 
growing anti-orient sentiment that lingered from the time of the Chinese.
163
 The 
Immigration Commission even concluded that the Japanese paid more for land then 
whites and it failed to slow their progress.
164
 
Decades of Asian immigration to the U. S. made the Japanese indistinguishable from the 
Chinese, and anti-Chinese aggression descended upon the newcomers of the Far East.
165
 
The Californian government passed anti-coolie, or anti-Chinese, legislation from the 
1850s well into the twentieth century. The foreigner‘s miners tax in the early 1852 
assured that every Asian in the state paid a special fine.
166
 Although early Japanese 
immigrants tried to adopt American customs, the economic value of their land, coupled 
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with their home government‘s desire for them to be treated as equals, led to 
discrimination against them.
167
 Backlash came in a variety of forms including a boycott 
of Japanese businesses and slogans such as ―Keep California White.‖
168
 By 1905 the 
Japanese became the sole targets of legislation. Having defeated the Chinese with the 
Exclusion Act in 1882, the laboring class turned its attention elsewhere.
169
 Californians 
tried in 1911 to get an alien land law bill through its Congress and failed.
170
 Soon white 
Californians would turn to the state legislature in order to prevent the Japanese from 
becoming successful through agriculture.
171
 
The final version of the California Alien Land Law of 1913 contained multiple sections 
and went through different drafts. Sections one and two contained the most controversial 
parts. The first section said:  
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―All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, 
possess, enjoy, transmit and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in 
the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as 
otherwise provided by the laws of this state.‖
172
 
 The second section held, ―All aliens other than those mentioned in section one of this act 
may acquire, possess, enjoy, and transfer real property, or any interest therein.‖
173
 
California‘s Attorney General stated that ―it [the alien land law] seeks to limit their 
presence by curtailing their privileges which they may enjoy here.‖
174
 The state made no 
secret that they wanted to prohibit Japanese success and their progress. If the alien land 
law bill accomplished that goal and Japanese emigration to the U. S. curtailed, the state 
needed no further amendments.
175
 
A potential problem with the law became apparent: Does it contradict the 1894 and 1911 
treaties with Japan allowing citizens of the opposite nation to acquire property?
176
 Some 
believed that the treaties merely allowed citizens the ―right to own houses and factories 
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and shops and to lease land‖ and not purchase land.
177
 An associated problem arose as the 
Japanese for years acquired land in California.
178
 When the alien land law bill first 
appeared Japanese officials assumed nothing can prevent California from passing 
legislation.
179
 Interpretation of the treaties and what they literally meant became the 
central issue. Although not written in either treaty specifically giving the Japanese the 
right to own land, it can be an assumed right, given the amount of privileges given to 
them regarding land ownership, and their treatment U. S. citizens regarding land 
possession in Japan. Japan‘s laws state that Americans can own land in Japan.
180 The 
cycle of excluding instead of assimilating bloomed and nothing prevented what was to 
come. One Californian State Representative commented of the purpose of the alien land 
bill was to force the Japanese out of the state.
181
  
After a public hearing about the Panama-Pacific Exposition, the state legislature of 
California investigated the matter of immigrants, specifically Japanese, and their ability 
                                                          
177
 ―Japan not a worry,‖ The Washington Post, 12 April 1913, 5. 
178
 ―Influx of Japanese annoys Canadians,‖ Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1913, 11. 
179
 ―Tokio press is violent,‖ New York Times, 16 April 1913, 3. Note to the reader: ―Tokio‖ is how it how 
the New York Times spelled it. 
180
 ―Japanese Law relating to foreigners rights‘ of ownership in land,‖ The American Journal of 
International Law, 5.3 (July 1911): 175. 
181
 ―Plan direct attack against Japanese,‖ New York Times, 22 April 1913, 1. 
80 
 
to purchase or lease land.
182
 Different measures appeared in the two chambers of the 
legislature but both wanted to accomplish one thing: ―the elimination of the Japanese 
farmers.‖
183
 State politicians crafted the bill similar to that of a 1897 federal alien land 
law regarding ownership in the District of Columbia.
184
 With overwhelming support at 
the state and local levels, California sent Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan 
notice that the passing the measure seemed concise.
185
 The people, frustrated and 
downright jealous of the Japanese immigrants, needed a way to curb their growth: both 
economically and materially. 
Viscount Chinda led the struggle to make sure the alien land law bill did not pass the 
California state legislature. He met with Secretary Bryan and by the end of the meeting, 
Bryan confirmed that Japan objected to the proposed law. 
186
 The Secretary monitored the 
growing situation carefully knowing that the potential for an international incident 
seemed likely.
187
 He recalled the San Francisco school segregation incident that 
embarrassed the previous administration.
188
 On April 10, 1913, Wilson met with Bryan 
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and members of the Californian U. S. house of representatives and let it be known that he 
refused federal involvement in the matter taking place in California as long as the law did 
not interfere with any treaty obligations.
189
 On April 12, 1913, Chinda met with the 
president and asked him to ―look into the legislation to see if anything could be done to 




Other nations became worried what the alien land law intended as European nations 
expressed concern what it meant for their business dealings in California. Different alien 
land law bills varied in intent and principles in Europe owned stock in several large 
corporations, owned significant amounts of valuable property, and they wanted their 
assets maintained. The proposed legislation affected their economic interest greatly.
191
 
Nations across the pond looked into defeating the measure all together because it 
potentially threatened their commercial endeavors.
192
 Italy made a formal diplomatic 
inquiry to the State Department regarding the matter.
193
 China contemplated filing a 
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protest over the alien land law bill.
194
 Weeks later, the alien land law bill became 
amended to suit European interest. California signaled to the world that hard work and 
money are appreciated there, just not if you are from Asia.
195
  
The citizens of Japan also watched the events unfolding in California with vested interest. 
Many began to see California as prejudice and planned to boycott the state if it passed 
any form of its alien land law. Some also threatened a boycott of Japanese participation in 
the Panama-Pacific exposition.
196
 The American Asiatic Association of Japan sent a 
message to its American counterpart saying 
―on account of serious unfriendly agitation throughout Japan due to proposed California 
legislation, strongly recommend sending United States Ambassador, also concerted 




The Japanese became hopeless due to distance, a history of anti-Asian discrimination 
throughout the state, and a Wilson Administration whose candor on the matter seemed 
mute. 
On April 12, 1913, Chinda became instructed to present a formal declaration of protest to 
the U. S.
198
 Rumors floated around that Japanese lands in California were going to be 
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confiscated as a result of the legislation.
199
 As the alien land law bill became amended, 
members of the Tokyo Chambers of Commerce wrote to the people of California 
―Japanese pay profoundest respect noble spirit America. Regret repeated appearances 
anti-Japanese bills your Congress. We hope earnestly not pass any bills which destroy 
good feeling between American and Japan.‖
200
 On April 13, 1913, the alien land law held 
in line with existing treaties.
201
 The changes failed to satisfy the Japanese government 
and the situation grew desperate.
202
 The Constitutional Party in Japan recommended a 
Californian boycott and citizens wrote letters of protests in an attempt to persuade public 
opinion.
203
 The Japanese understood that if the bill passed in the California Legislature, 
the only course of grievance became the U. S. Supreme Court.
204
 
On April 16, 1913, President Wilson held through on his promise to the Japanese 
ambassador, he began to look into the issue. Wilson met with members of his Cabinet to 
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 He concluded that if any law passed, it mirrored laws already 
in existence. One of the proposed bills contained a clause making those ―ineligible to 
citizenship‖ unable to acquire land. The Japanese became ruled ineligible for citizenship 
in 1892 in a federal circuit court decision and it was re-affirmed in 1900 and nobody 
challenged the ruling in the Supreme Court.
206
 Wilson sent a telegram to Johnson that 
urged him to drop the phrase from the final bill. The president turned down an 
opportunity to visit with a delegation from California who wanted to explain the state‘s 
position on the matter. Wilson merely kept in touch with the California Legislature 
informally and took a wait and see approach. His two-faced tactic on the issue is half-
hearted. He could have scheduled a meeting with Chinda, the delegation, and attempted 
to find a diplomatic solution.
207
 
But just as Wilson seemed apathetic to the plight of the Japanese situation in California, 
he decided to get more involved. He ordered Bryan to telegram Johnson and asked him to 
eliminate parts of the bill that aimed directly at the Japanese.
208
 The Secretary also met 
with Chinda to provide reassurance that the two governments still contained friendly 
relations.
209
 The president scheduled another meeting of the Cabinet to further discuss the 
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 Wilson sent Bryan to California in an attempt to get the legislature 
to change their mind regarding aspects of the bill.
211
 The chief of state still held that the 
issue was a matter of states rights and that the federal government‘s involvement in the 
issue was to insure the law did not violate treaty obligations.
212
 Johnson defended his 
state‘s actions by citing several other states that already contained similar alien land law 
legislation, some of them very recently. In 1912, Arizona and several other states enacted 
similar measures that California now attempted to accomplish.
213
 He held that any 
legislation that passed fulfilled any treaty obligation between the U. S. and Japan.
214
  
 Outside influences affected the perception of the fairness of the alien land law 
bill. The 1894 and 1911 treaties with Japan allowed for land and Americans living in the 
country vouched the claim and provided ways of acquiring land. A doctor living in 
Tokyo told that the situation in California prevented him from successfully raising money 
to build a new hospital. Also, Dr. Iyenaga mentioned that war talk appeared in Japanese 
newspapers.
215
 Although in Tokyo on April 17, roughly 20,000 people ―cheered wildly as 
a member of the Diet demanded the sending of the Imperial Fleet to California to protect 
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Japanese subjects and maintain the nation‘s dignity,‖
216
 the war talk appeared to be 
nothing more than rumblings in the streets of Japan. One Japanese naval officer believed 
that conflict for the two countries seemed remote. The economic consequences for the 
two countries made war not an option.
217
  The phrase ―ineligible to citizenship‖ 
disappeared from the final version of the bill due to the indirect reference that the 
Japanese being sole targets of the legislation. 
 The Japanese fought against several things working against them. One was a belief that 
they were dishonest businessmen.
218
 The African American community reported that the 
Japanese economic success made them a target; something white Californians believed 
needed to be eliminated.
219
 The Chinese League believed it became appropriate to restrict 
the Japanese because the law, if passed, distinguished between dominate Asian ethnic 
groups. This happened because the Chinese owned less land then the Japanese.
220
 
Another problem the Japanese encountered that while talking to reporters, Wilson 
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mentioned that the current treaties with Japan to not give Japanese citizens the right to 
own land.
221
 Article 1 of the 1911 treaty with Japan does not allow them to own land but 
does allow for them ―to lease land for residential and commercial purposes‖ and ―to own 
or lease and occupy houses.‖
222
 The heart of the issue lay with the Californian people 
themselves whose blind discrimination against a foreigner, whom through capitalism 
achieved success quicker, reached the point where their bigotry became law. One U. S. 
Congressmen wanted an investigation into how California violated treaties between the 
U. S. and Japan.
223
 
On April 22, Wilson contacted the leadership of California and expressed concern over 
the bill‘s legality. Johnson held firm on his belief of the bill‘s justified intentions. Having 
heard enough from Johnson, Wilson sent Bryan to California. During Bryan‘s four day 
trip by train to the west coast, all proceedings regarding the alien land law shut down. 
During this time the phrase ―ineligible to citizenship‖ dropped from the legislation. Bryan 
arrived in California with virtually no orders from Wilson and it showed with his lack of 
effort. Although the meetings ran behind closed doors, any hope the Japanese carried at 
stopping the legislation ended. Shortly after Bryan departed back for Washington, the 
California legislature passed the alien land law bill by a vote of 35 to 2 in the Senate and 
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72 to 3 in the assembly. On May 19, Johnson signed the bill into law after a brief delay at 
the request of Wilson.
224
 
Although Wilson attempted to derail the alien land law bill, he lacked the political desire 
to mount a campaign against it as he would Article X of the League of Nations. The 
president knew that the issue to be a matter of states rights and decided not to heavily 
pursue the matter and reward came his way in 1916. Wilson ran for re-election and 
needed California to win. The state voted for him and he skilled his way into a 2
nd
 term in 
office. His forward thinking and judgment allowed him not to overplay an important 
issue, one that could have cost him an election. As the controversy took off, Wilson 
argued, 
―The incident justifies the employment of every influence the Federal Government may 
have with the Governor and Legislature of California to persuade them so to modify the 




Although Wilson was not governor of the state, he decided not to do more. He merely 
wanted to maintain positive relations with Japan and leave the incident behind him.
226
 
The alien land bill limited leases to the Japanese to more than three years and prohibited 
further land purchases by them. Johnson defended his state‘s actions but knew of easy 
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ways around the law so where the Japanese could still do business. The Japanese 
government took the issue up with Washington for several more months, believing 
California violated treaty rights. Wilson continued to point out that the state legislature 
passed a law to which specifically fails to mention the Japanese in particular. Although 




 After the alien land law bill passed, the Japanese went to work to find ways 
around it. One of the ways at circumventing the law became to borrow the name of an 
American citizen of legal age. The American-born Japanese people in Hawaii frequently 
supplied their names to those in California to help out.  Americans who sympathized with 
the Japanese occasionally gave a name as well. The Japanese created dummy 
corporations, as another loop-hole, where a major of the stock was owned by American 
citizens on the land. A law firm became specialized in the legal matter and more than 300 
Japanese businesses formed because of it.
228
 The Japanese community quickly learned 
whom to trust and whom preyed upon them and word spread throughout communities.
229
 
They did all of this despite the fact that throughout the state there was little enforcement 
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of the alien land law bill. Even with the 1923 and 1927 amendments, the Japanese owned 
and worked on land up until World War II.
230
 The Alien Land Law of 1913 succeeded at 
first as the numbers of Japanese owners decreased, but then the numbers rose 
exponentially and doubled by 1922. The children of the Issei, U. S. citizens by birth, 
never encountered the effects of the any of the alien land law bills. The ―Nisei‖ 




 After seven years of loop holes and circumventing the law, at least in the eyes of 
some of the citizens in California, anger and frustration to reached a boiling point. 
Various anti-Japanese groups united around a clause designed to do what they believe the 
Alien Land Law of 1913 failed to do. The Native Sons and Daughters and the 
Legionnaries gathered signatures and presented an initiative for the 1920 ballot. The 
group believed that they should make ―a state law that will make it impossible for 
Japanese to get possession of the soil.‖
232
 Although the measure passed, the group‘s 
efforts to plug the holes failed. By 1920 the Japanese became well versed in the legal 
system and Nisei generation owned the land. For the most part, the U. S. justice system 
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worked. The state legislature clearly supported the measure and ordered an in depth 
review of all Japanese land holdings in the state. Their findings affected voters and 
advocated for even further initiatives. The new governor ―pointed out that the pending 
initiative measure would ‗exhaust the state‘s power in dealing with this great race 
problem.‘‖
233
 He added that issue could only be solved by the U. S. Congress with an 
exclusion act, just like the Chinese. By the summer of 1920 the issue roared on as 
political campaigns became in full swing. Candidates from both parties pressed for the 
issue in their various campaign stops. All throughout the state, newspapers supported the 




The process for the new amendment started in early February 1920. The state Superior 
Court heard a case in which a Japanese man controlled land in the name of his American 
born children. The judge ruled that the Japanese man acted improperly and wanted the 
two sides to find common ground on the issue.
235
 Later that month, the state attorney 
general took to court another Japanese man who owned a home in San Francisco.
236
 The 
Japanese started purchasing land under corporate titles with American names as their 
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directors in order to shield themselves from the law.
237
 With the Japanese having worked 
the legal system effectively, one Japanese diplomat said of the alien land law bill of 1913 
―we who are in the foreign service are between the devil and the deep sea so far as our 
mouth is concerned.‖
238
 Even though labor groups won a victory in an attempt to get 
Japanese off Californian land, their fight was just getting started. 
The 1913 and 1920 alien land laws in California are examples of political economic 
racism. The Japanese were the only targets of the legislation and other ethnic groups were 
ignored. The Japanese simply became too successful in agriculture and an overzealous 
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Chapter Five: California’s Alien Land Laws of 1923 and 1927 
The 1920s witnessed increased activity on the alien land law front, as well as an 
exclusion act for the Japanese. Although California possessed laws aimed at making sure 
the Japanese did not own land, labor groups noticed their lack of compliance with the 
law. They decided to continue their assault to make sure the Japanese did not own, 
possess, or lease any real property. The purpose of this chapter is show the further 
development of alien land laws and the exclusion act. 
On January 27, 1922, the Japanese Association of America announced that Louis 
Marshall, an expert on constitutional law, was hired as an attorney to challenge 
California's alien land laws in the U. S. Supreme Court.
239
 The attacks against the alien 
land laws continued, however, at the state level. The following month, Raymond L. Flick 
filed a motion to prevent N. Satow, a Japanese citizen, from purchasing his ―twenty-eight 
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shares of stock in the Merced Farm Company.‖
240
A Sonoma county grand jury indicted 
Y. Akado for allegedly entering into an agreement with W. A. Cockerill in an attempt to 
violate the alien land laws. Cockerill was accused of acquiring land for Mr. Akado.  
Akado supposedly gave Cockerill a payment of $150 for his service, after he received the 
land. Akado's defense claimed that since Mr. Cockerill maintained the title for the land, 
no violation of the alien land law occurred. The California State Supreme Court took up 
the matter, the first case to go before the state, challenging the laws. Since the Japanese 




 On May 1, the California State Supreme Court declared a provision in the alien 
land law as unconstitutional. The court ruled that parents can serve as guardians of land 
for their American-born children. Japanese resident Haya Yano brought the suit to court 
over the estate he purchased for his daughter. In the Court's ruling, the judge stated, ―The 
child is a native of the United States and of the state of California. Nothing can be denied 
to her because of her race or color that is not denied to all citizens, regardless of race or 
color.‖
242
 Also, the Los Angeles Times published, ―the court held, because the right of 
privilege of a father to be the guardian of own minor child does not in any respect depend 
upon or rise out of his nationally or his eligibility to citizenship in this country. It has no 
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 By mid August, the Grizzly Bear, the publication of the Native Sons and 
Daughters of the Golden Coast, publicly condemned Governor Stephen's tactics on 
handling the Japanese Question. The editor of the Grizzly Bear, Clarence R. Hunt, said 
―Gov. Stephens has done absolutely nothing, except talk, in the campaign against the 
Japs, and he failed even to talk until the alien land law was adopted in 1920 by an 
overwhelming vote.‖
244
 Hunt continued his written assault on the governor by claiming 
he was allowing the Japanese to invade the state peacefully while the governor called his 
opponents ―cheap‖ merely for following the law and removing the menace known as the 
Japanese. Hunt called for on Stephens to fight not only the Japanese growth in the state 
but, also to eliminate it all together. He believed Japanese development was the single 
greatest threat the state ever faced, placing it above the Chinese.
245
 The editorial got 
Governor Stephen's attention and the following month, a suit was filed in order to 
forcibly re-take land leased to Tojero Tagami.
246
 
 By 1923, Californians believed the 1913 and 1920 alien land laws had become 
ineffective. A new tide of anti-Japanese grew, and another alien land law pressed its way 
in the California State Legislature. Tojuero Tagami, who possessed property near Fort 
MacArthur, challenged the laws as the state attempted to relieve him of his ownership of 
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the land. Tagami claimed the alien land laws violated the U. S. treaty with Japan because 
it allows for the leasing of land for commercial use.
247
 
The Japanese challenged the laws in the Supreme Court. Louis Marshall, representing 
Japanese interest, claimed the laws violated the fourteenth amendment as the alien land 
laws attacked the Japanese because of their color and race. California Attorney General 
Webb argued the Japanese refused to allow people, who are eligible to become citizens, 
access to the land that they own. The state of California believed citizens ―who have 
sympathy with our institutions and can be compelled to contribute to its preservation [of 
the land].‖
248
 Webb continued with his remarks believing the government needed to 
protect the white man and compared the events in California as a possible Civil War.
249
 
 On July 11, the Superior Court in California ruled in favor of Tagami. Judge 
Hewitt claimed he used ―a liberal interpretation‖ of the law and believed California 
violated the U. S., Japanese treaty of 1911, making the alien land laws void since 
Japanese residents are allowed to lease land for commercial use.
250
 California appealed 
Judge Hewitt's decision and took the matter to the Supreme Court. On November 12, the 
Supreme Court sided with California and upheld the alien land laws. The court held firm 
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that ―that states could prohibit from owning land alien eligible to citizenship but who had 
not declared their intentions.‖
251
 The Court even cited a letter that Viscount Chinda wrote 
to Secretary of State Bryan in 1916, acknowledging the fact the Japanese possessed no 
legal right to own land in America.
252
  
The new alien land law went further than its predecessor and stated aliens ineligible to 
citizenship could not lease land. Californians the economic base of which the Japanese 
immigrant lived.
253
 The Japanese responded by writing carefully written cropping 
contracts in order to shield themselves from the law. The contracts provided temporary 
relief as nobody knew the legality of such contracts. In July 1921, Webb declared the 
contracts illegal. The Japanese Agriculture Association (JAA) met and discussed options 
of handling the recent turn of events. In a second meeting, the assembly decided to raise 
$25,000 for the purposes of challenging the law. The Central Japanese Association of 
Southern California launched a similar compliant unknown to the JAA. The two groups 
teamed up, even shared expenses, and decided to separating challenge the law but render 
the decision made by the court system binding for their separate court cases. In court, the 
Japanese won one case but lost another. After appeal after appeal and cases reaching the 
U. S. Supreme Court, two years of legal struggle ended as the high court declared the 
1920 alien land law not in violation of the Constitution or the 1911 U. S. treaty with 
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The Japanese Association of America recognized the fight against the alien land laws 
ended with the Supreme Court decision and instructed all Japanese citizens to comply 
with the laws. Despite the compliance the organization said, ―we thought this law was in 
violation of the Constitution. If we had not looked to America with absolute faith in her 
spirit we could never have appealed to the Supreme Court for the better protection of our 
rights.‖
255
 Because of the ruling, many Japanese sought to leave California after the 
harvest ended.  The Japanese supplied nearly half of the lettuce and cauliflower in the 
state. White farmers in the Santa Marie Valley already looked to produce more than what 
the Japanese did once they left town.
256
 
 The campaign for a ―white California‖ was finally showing results as ―more than 
30,000 Japanese farmers are preparing to abandon nearly 500,000 acres of California's 
richest crop lands.‖
257
 The Japanese lost 458,056 acres that generated $ 67,145,730 worth 
of produce.
258
 The Japanese dominated many of the crops in the state. They supplied 
―celery, 85 to 90 percent of State total: berries, 90 to 95 per cent; asparagus, 70 to 75; 
cantaloupes, 65 to 70; onions, 85 to 90; tomatoes,75 to 80; mixed vegetables, 90 to 95; 
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grapes, 25 to 30; deciduous fruits, 70 to 75; lettuce, 85 to 90.‖
259
 As Senator Hiram 
Johnson sought re-election, on the campaign trail he made a speech saying ―At the next 
session of Congress it is no secret that the California congressional delegation intends to 
make its fight for exclusion.‖
260
 
 At the time of the alien land law of 1923 discussion in California, in Washington, 
D.C., the house Committee on Immigration passed a measure severely reducing the 
number of emigrants allowed to enter the country. The measure included a provision that 
excluded the Japanese from coming to America. The bill affirmed ―an immigrant not 
eligible for citizenship shall not be admitted to the United States unless within the class 
specified in [certain] subdivisions.‖
261
 The Chairman of the Immigration Committee, 
Albert Johnson, explained the ―provision is in accordance with the United States 
Supreme Court decision and does not interfere with any treaties.‖
262
 Because of that, the 
Congressman believed that the State Department and the Japanese government held no 
grounds from which they could protest. Even though the committee worked on the bill 
for months, Asians, specifically the Japanese, became the committee's main goal of 
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whose numbers they sought to reduce, not exclude.
263
  
The Japanese Foreign Minister, K.Matsui held his government wished to be treated like 
other nations of the world. He proclaimed the ―Japanese are disturbed over the increasing 
restrictions upon Japanese residents by the United States and the proposals now before 
Congress for exclusion of Japanese.‖
264
 Japanese newspapers responded differently to the 
news of possible exclusion. The Yorozh Chono took ―an extreme view‖ of the situation, 
while as the Tokio Nichi Nichi Shimbun expressed disappointment and suggested ―that 
Japan obtain from America approval for Japanese expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia 
in return for Japan's recognition of America's discriminatory treatment of the 
Japanese.‖
265
 The Japanese government balanced their response by replying they did ―not 
intend to demand that the United States grant citizenship to the Japanese but regrets such 
application of naturalization laws as to accord discriminatory treatment to Japanese 
settlers.‖
266
 The Japanese sought to express the right way to confront the immigration bill 
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at a later time.
267
 
 Shortly after representatives from various industries testified on Capitol Hill, the 
senate Committee on Immigration expressed a different view from their colleagues in the 
house and held they could not vote on the measure based off the ―present conditions in 
the chamber.‖
268
 The witnesses believed the economy would suffer without a steady 
supply of labor coming into the country. They also argued that several states already 
faced a shortage of labor and did not believe any exclusion clause was needed. R. C. 
Marshall Jr., the General Manager of the Associated General Contractors, recently 
arrived from Los Angeles, and was told by companies that Japanese labor was needed for 
work. The projects in questioned called for more than 300,000 men. At the National 
Immigration Conference, business and political leaders met to gather ideas about the 
immigration issue in order to submit their ideas to Congress. Dr. Henry Osburn pleaded 
for selective immigration. He believed the nation was being threatened by the number of 
emigrants entering and that it endangered the nation's top stock. Osburn mentioned the 
Japanese cannot become citizens.
269
 
 In March of the following year, the senate passed its version of the immigration 
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bill by a vote of 62 to 6. The senate version differed from their house colleagues in that it 
banned Asiatics the moment the president signed the bill into law.
270
 The Japanese 
Ambassador, Masano Hanihara, condemned the actions of the U.S. Congress. Chairman 
Johnson downplayed the idea the Ambassador's letter influence the vote. The Minnesota 
Senator believed that prior to Hanihara's letter, the senate possessed enough votes to pass 
the immigration bill. Also, the Chairman's understanding of the ―gentlemen's agreement‖ 
was that if it failed, an exclusion act was possible. He held the view Asians could not 
assimilate into American culture and therefore, the U.S. should limit the amount of 
people from that region who wish to enter.
271
 President Calvin Coolidge attempted to 
play both sides of fence as he wanted to keep the exclusion clause in the immigration bill, 
yet do so as not to offend the Japanese. The White House statement surprised members of 
the senate on the Foreign Affairs and Immigration committees. The senators mentioned 
both the house and senate agreed to continue the ―gentlemen's agreement‖ and the 
conference committee expressed no desire to discuss it any more. Chairman Johnson 
continued to argue for Japanese exclusion, not a quota, and he also equated the Japanese 
to the Chinese and believed the Congress needed to pass a similar act.
272
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 Standing before the senate Committee on Immigration, James Phelan, a former 
senator from California, argued for Japanese exclusion. He reminded the chamber the 
U.S. government drew a line in the sand between those who are eligible for citizenship 
and those who are not. Phelan believed the Japanese avoided its obligations in the 
―gentlemen's agreement‖ and that nearly 38,000 women arrived in the country 
fraudulently.
273
 The following month in April, Hanihara warned of ―grave consequences‖ 
if an exclusion act passed the Congress.
274
 
 In early May, the President announced he wanted the date of when the 
immigration bill went into effect pushed back by many months. This demand angered 
senators on both parties and even the Senators who represented the White House's 
position took backlash at the idea. Senators Johnson and Shortridge, both from 
California, believed the matter needed to be resolved through the Congress, not the White 
House. Chairman Johnson announced he planned to submit his conference to the floor of 
the House for debate the following day. Both sides geared up for the debate, including 
California Congressman John Raker, who led the Pacific Coast states and the fight for the 
exclusion amendment. Senator Johnson proclaimed on the floor the Japanese in his state 
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requested more brides be sent across the ocean.
275
 Despite the President's call for an 
extension, his words fell on deaf ears as the immigration bill passed the House by a vote 
of 308 to 58 and a senate vote of 69 to 9. Even if Coolidge vetoed the measure, both 
chambers possessed the votes to override.
276
  
After a few days of consultation with his senior advisors, Coolidge realized the fight to 
delay Japanese exclusion was over. The Japanese government was expected to make a 
formal protest when the president signed the immigration bill into law.
277
 In response to 
the congress passing the exclusion act, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan resigned.
278
 On 
May 26, President Coolidge signed the immigration bill into law. He stated if the 
Congress simply passed a Japanese Exclusion Act, he would have vetoed it. Californian 
Senator Hiram Johnson said of the immigration bill ―it is a matter of congratulation and 
rejoicing that California finally prevails in the long struggle for the protection and 
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preservation of its own.‖
279
 Senator Samuel Shortridge of California said ―we of 
California who have urged the exclusion of alien ineligible to citizenship are profoundly 
grateful to those from other sections of the country who have assisted us.‖
280
 
 The day after the immigration bill took effect, protest erupted across Japan. The 
incidents made the Japanese government warn Americans living in Japan to avoid public 
places as the day was marked as anti-American day in Tokyo.
281
 At the national Grange 
Convention, the executive committee adopted a resolution passed by the California 
chapter expressing support for the immigration bill. The organization boasted its 
involvement in securing the bill's passage. The Grange protested any more immigration 
changes ―on the ground that the present provisions are a necessary safeguard to the 
American farm home and to the white race.‖
282
 
The issue of Japanese exclusion first began in 1916. The house voted for an immigration 
bill which included a provision prohibiting Japanese immigration. President Wilson met 
with the Japanese Ambassador and the White House convinced the Congress to pass a 
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different immigration bill that did not include a ban on Japanese immigration. One of the 
big reasons for the change was that Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover met with 
Chairman Johnson. Hoover told him that American companies in Japan faced $ 200 
million in losses because the government threatened to cancel their contracts if the bill 
passed. While Coolidge pondered over signing the immigration bill, an article appeared, 
saying, ―Leaders among the exclusionists faction...believe that if the bill is vetoed 
California will be lost to the President in the November election and swing over to the 
Democratic side for the reason that Democrats in both houses have voted solidly for 
Exclusion.‖
283
 This situation allegedly weighed on Coolidge's mind in determining 
whether to allow the measure to pass. 
 During the Great Depression, Japanese families suffered right along millions of 
other families as they just tried to get by. When the Japanese in California began to lose 
their farms, many sought work outside of agriculture. This void on the farmland created a 
shortage of workers. Many Japanese turned to Mexicans or Filipinos who worked on 
Japanese farms seasonally when their labor was needed. The Japanese preferred these 
groups because of their ability to work longer hours for less pay. This worked out well 
initially, however, as time went on, Mexicans refused to accept the low wages and strike 
for a better wage. The Japanese responded by using small Niesi school children to work 
on the farm. The children solution only provided temporary relief and the two sides 
eventually negotiated a deal.
284
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 The Niesi generation affected the Issei directly as they knew both Japanese and 
English. With their being no language barrier, many Niesi went into town and sought 
cheaper goods when it was available. In 1934 in Los Angeles, the Issei attempted to 
appease the Niesi by offering ―Niesi Week‖ and hired them for the occasion. The event 
failed to galvanize that particular generation and they soon returned to their old ways of 
not purchasing Issei made products. 
285
 Many Japanese women during this time worked 
alongside their husband on the farm to help out the family. In the event of their husband‘s 
death, many women took over the head of the household role and continued the family 
business. The oldest child usually assisted the mother in the family business. One woman 
described her hardship of widowhood ―I was left with seven children, and the youngest 
was only two years old. I worked in place of my late husband, growing vegetables and 
making noodles by machine to sell.‖
286
  
 The Niesi generation attempted to break away from the family business by getting 
a higher education. Although some received degrees from universities throughout 
California, the schools acknowledge the inability of this group to locate work. The 
Depression only made the prospects of this groups finding work outside the family even 
more difficult. The University of California at Berkeley said ―The supply of applicants 
more than exceeds the demand for positions of all kinds, and California employers are 
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On December 7, 1941, the empire of Japan launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Navy 
base in Hawaii at Pearl Harbor. In response, the U.S. declared war on Japan. But inside 
the country, a different kind of battle raged. The government announced the formation of 
internment camps of all Japanese-American citizens and up to 100,000 people needed to 
move.
288
 As the Japanese lived in the camps, some communities attempted to squeeze the 
Japanese economically so where they would not return. In Oregon, towns erased the 
names of its Japanese citizens who actively served in the U.S. military.
289
 
 Many Japanese returned to California after the war ended and started to rebuild 
their lives. Although California no longer practices political economic racism against its 
Asian immigrants, the lessons of the past can be applied to the present. Given the growth 
of the Hispanic population in California over the past three decades, new legislation to 
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The mid-ninetieth century marked a turning point in American history, the echoes of 
which continue on till this day. The Chinese arrived with welcomed arms, only to be 
quickly treated with distain.  Californians used violence and economic sanctions against 
the Chinese as they increasing saw them as not as fellow immigrants, but as something to 
be feared. Labor groups, along with the Californian State Legislature, enacted laws 
designed to curtail Chinese economic progress. These laws proved to be ineffective as 
wave after wave of Chinese immigrants landed in California and found success. 
Businesses continued to desire and hire Chinese labor over other ethnic groups. White 
labor pressured the Congress into passing the Exclusion Act in 1882. Although originally 
constructed to prohibit Chinese labor for ten years, the legislation soon went permanent. 
The environment known as Yellow Peril, the fear of the Asian immigrant, was not over. 
The Japanese started to arrive just two years after the Chinese became excluded. They 
experienced the same type of the Chinese first received; then came the discrimination.  
Although the Japanese government protested, California passed an alien land law in 1913 
with additions in 1920, 1923, and 1927. The Western states, led by California, pushed for 
an Exclusion Act for the Japanese.  The California legislature anti-Japanese sentiment 
carried on for decades and its ugly head roared up again for the internment camps of 
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Japanese Americans during World War II.  
The same type of Yellow Peril that existed for the Japanese immigrants continues to exist 
in the form of discrimination toward illegal Mexicans. For years they worked, supported 
their families, living peacefully among Americans. Groups similar to that of the Native 
Sons and Daughters and the Legionnaries support propositions that call for Mexicans to 
leave. California‘s Dr. Jekyll and Ms. Hyde approach to foreigners follows in the same 
form of their ancestors. They love the immigrants to do the labor but once when they start 
being successful, it is time for them to leave, and bring in another group to exploit. 
Whether Chinese, Japanese, or illegal Mexicans these groups influenced the many 
different aspects of life for Californians and the rest of the U. S. The political economic 
racist approach lives on as the illegal Mexicans gain traction and attempt to move up the 
socio-economic ladder. 
Just as the Japanese found themselves nervous with the state of affairs in 1913, nearly 70 
years later, the illegal Mexicans, predominately in California, but spread throughout the 
U. S., experience similar conditions. Both worked jobs or in industries Americans 
typically did not work. Both labored for low wages, housed in ethnic similar 
communities, and experienced discrimination in their time. Although most of the 
Japanese arrived legally, the illegal Mexicans in the U. S. feel the pressure from political 
interest groups who strive to remove them. Even though the round-up would cost 
millions, detention centers to hold the Mexicans over for deportations do not exist, and 
the process would create several other local, state, and federal nightmares. These interest 
groups share the same fears Californians possessed in the early 1910s. Whether Japanese 
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or illegal Mexicans, communities should attempt to bring people together and not 
segregate them from society. Over the years in California the proposed propositions 
regarding illegal Mexicans speak no different from the anti-alien legislation passed 




The legislation signed by Arizona Governor Jan Brewer in the spring of 2010 echoes the 
type of legislation signed by several California Governors and U.S. Presidents. Although 
the act was not economically motivated, it carries all too familiar tones of racism that 
California often expressed during its Yellow Peril. The political economic racism passed 
by California from 1848 - 1943, set the standard for race prejudice during its time. We 
must strive to avoid such legislation in the future as we continue to build a great nation.  
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